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Seven authors in this issue examine Mainland China's relationships with other areas of the world, and the political, economic and population pressures within the country. Our first author describes how "natural disaster, the ravages of local warlords and the accumulated resentments of landlord exploitation [in the mid-1920's] exposed for Mao the key to the 'boundless energy of the masses' . . . which, once liberated, could make the peasants a revolutionary force."

The Pattern of the Chinese Revolution

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POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS in the Western world and the social changes associated with them have above all been urban phenomena. The political traditions of the West have grown from the experiences of the Greek city-state, and the Rome of the Caesars. The roots of present-day industrial and artistic developments are to be found in the cities of Renaissance Italy; and Western religious values are symbolized in the urban centers of Rome and Jerusalem. The pattern of political revolution in an industrializing age also bears the labels of urban foci: the Bastille and the Commune of Paris, and the Leningrad Soviet.

The highly visible political revolutions of our time were preceded by less evident social changes which were decades or even centuries in the making. Developments in commerce, technology and manufacturing processes made possible the growth of new social groupings and classes; and the revolutions of power tended to reflect *existing* changes in social relationships and resources, with the pattern of change proceeding outward from urban centers. It is perhaps the "naturalness" of

this pattern of social change in the West which has limited our ability to comprehend the workings of the social revolutions now convulsing the underdeveloped areas of the world. We hear Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao's assertion that the revolutions of the present era will be made by "surrounding the cities with the countryside," but American culture and experience do not enable Americans to comprehend the full meaning that lies behind Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung's political-military strategy of "people's war."

What is the underlying social pattern of the Chinese revolution? And what lessons does it hold for a United States which seeks to adjust to revolutionary change in cultures and nations far removed from its own experience? Had there been no war in Vietnam these questions would seem less pressing; but given our frustrating and costly involvement in the Vietnamese conflict we see all too clearly that the United States has failed to draw the proper conclusions from its earlier unsuccessful effort to relate to China and her revolution. In the following discussion, certain

distinctive characteristics of the Chinese revolution will be highlighted, in the hope that they will make Americans more aware of the paradoxical choices that confront them as the United States reconsiders the nature and extent of its involvement in Asia and other underdeveloped areas.

China's traditional political life, like her peasant-based agricultural economy, has been predominantly rural in focus. The imperial dynasties drew their strength from the Confucian-oriented gentry, a small leadership stratum linked to the land-tenure system and based on the quiet life of provincial administrative centers and clan villages.

The millennial endurance of this agrarian and family-centered political tradition was paralleled by the limited development of an urban life style. China's few metropolitan centers and her provincial capitals were primarily centers of administrative and defense activity. The scholar-officials, seeing their life style and political power threatened by the expansion of commerce or technology, stunted the growth of powerful independent centers of business and manufacturing activity. They checked the growth of heterodox views of society by linking the skill of literacy to the rote memorization of Confucian classics. In short, China's traditional urban life was not a center of new ideas or new sources of wealth, power, or social change; the "center of gravity" of this society was rural.

THE PATTERN SHATTERS

This pattern of social and political life in imperial China was shattered during the last century by a combination of internal and external factors. Internally, there were population pressures and peasant rebellion and a recurrently experienced decline in the vitality of dynastic leadership. But there were also the new factors: the penetration of foreign military and commercial power, new social and religious ideas, new educational practices and the example of foreign revolutionary experience.

Until World War II, it appeared likely that China would join the modern world

through much the same pattern of political and social change that had been characteristic of the West. The centers of her twentieth century revolution were urban; but rather than being indigenous they were the product of Western intrusion: the coastal treaty port centers of commerce, manufacturing and educational opportunity were precisely the kind of social development which had been resisted by generations of conservative Confucian scholar-officials. These cities of the foreigner gave birth to new generations of Chinese with largely imported notions of how to modernize their society. The more moderate or conservative of these young people lent their talents and skills to the new Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, with its capital in Nanking. The Nationalists based their power on the slim periphery of coastal industrial centers still linked to foreign commerce and political support, while they sought indigenous backing from those political forces rooted in landed wealth.

Even China's more extreme revolutionaries of the 1920's and the 1930's saw the cities as a focus of change. The newly formed Chinese Communist party, with urging and assistance from the Comintern, sought to come to power and bring about change by mobilizing the country's small working class. During the 1920's the Communists and Nationalists competed for control of this small margin of modernity and industrial power in what remained an overwhelmingly peasant society.

Between 1927 and 1932, two events profoundly altered the pattern of the Chinese revolution, reversing its pattern of growth. Instead of urban centers of change extending their influence out to the rural areas the pattern shifted to focus on "the countryside encircling the cities." First, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang or Nationalist party succeeded in crushing the urban organizational base of the Chinese Communist party. Between April and December of 1927, Chiang's armies destroyed the power of the Communists in the labor unions, and routed their small military forces from the major cities. The Communist party leadership was thrown into organizational disarray.

Some of the party's most determined young leaders fled to the mountains of south China, anxious not only to save their lives but to seek new ways of gaining power.

The second major event was the Japanese invasion of China, beginning with the occupation of Manchuria in late 1931, and leading to the full-scale invasion of China proper during the summer of 1937. This series of Japanese attacks overburdened a Nationalist government still trying to consolidate its power. Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to deal a final death blow to the Communists' newly formed peasant armies were thwarted by Japanese military pressures and a still-fragmented domestic political life. The peasant military forces, built by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh in the mountains of southern China, had been driven with considerable effort by Chiang's armies into a decimating "long march," which saw the party's new leadership escape to the northwest province of Shensi. Had the Japanese not invaded China proper in the summer of 1937, it seems very likely that Chiang would have destroyed this small and isolated Communist leadership core.

¹ Some of the flavor of the peasants' desire to avoid contact with those with political power, and the manner in which China's pre-Communist revolution had passed them by is contained in the following recollection by a peasant from the north China province of Shensi:

When I was nineteen, I got myself sheep and goats of my own, and two years after that we heard that there was a revolution. I ran off to the hills. Then we were told that now we were called the Republic of China, and that the Ch'ing dynasty was at an end. That was all. We were old country people, and seldom went into the town and never talked about such things as the emperor or government. Nobody would have dared do that. And we never saw them either. The officials in the nearest yamen watched over us, and they were the same after the revolution as before it.

Ordinary people did not like . . . to see the officials. That was a thing one did only if compelled. If one met them, one had to kneel before them. It was exactly the same after the revolution. I could not see that there was any difference at all.

From Jan Myrdal, *Report from a Chinese Village* (London: Heinemann, 1965), pp. 286-87.

A more complete discussion of the problems the Chinese Communists faced in dealing with the political passivity of the peasantry is contained in my article, "America's Revolutionary Alliance with Communist China," *Asian Survey*, December, 1967, esp. pp. 833-40.

But the Japanese did attack, driving the Nationalist government out of the coastal cities where their rule was most secure to the backwater Yangtze town of Chungking. And in the ensuing eight years of warfare, the Communists found a new lease on life. Freed from the threat of imminent Nationalist attack they set about building themselves a new peasant army, using the national "war of resistance" against Japan as a framework for their own political legitimacy. They built their military and organizational strength on the leadership of idealistic intellectuals who had fled the cities, using the manpower of uprooted peasants.

The events of the war against the foreign invader and the subsequent civil conflict leading to the Communist conquest of China in 1949 have been told elsewhere in great detail. What is only now becoming obvious, however, is the legacy of this revolutionary experience, in which a small group of radical intellectuals built a "workers" party composed largely of peasants, and led a peasant army under the control of that party in the conquest of national power.

What is the particular style of political action that has grown from this pattern of revolution? And why do Mao and his supporters loudly proclaim that their revolutionary experience is a model for the peoples of the underdeveloped world? An answer to these questions begins with the rather simple observation that the Communists in China launched their revolution on the social base of peasantry. Not only were peasants the main source of manpower for their armies, but the Communist party itself, on attaining power, was nearly 80 per cent a peasant party—and it remains in majority a peasant party to this day.

The peasantry has been a particularly problematical social class for those of a Communist political orientation. Both Marx and Lenin recognized the conservative and basically apolitical orientation of the peasants: their tenacious commitment to the land and family life; their basically antirevolutionary social views; and above all, their desire to avoid involvement in politics.¹ While they

might provide manpower for revolutionary movements, they were not considered a class capable of playing a leading role in the revolutions of Europe. And as we pointed out earlier, even the first decade of Communist activity in China proceeded on the assumption that the workers would be the leading force of the revolution. It was only the crushing of party power in the urban areas in 1927 which forced a reconsideration of this basic Marxist premise, and gave Mao Tse-tung—a young man who earlier had displayed a heterodox enthusiasm for the revolutionary potential of the peasantry—an opportunity to build a political movement on the power base of a peasant army.

How did Mao succeed—where others had hardly tried—in making the peasantry the main force of a social revolution? Trial and error efforts to mobilize them into the Red Armies over nearly two decades gave Mao a firm belief in a formula for political participation that seems to be composed of four essential elements: First, the use of a *revolutionary ideology* to explain to the peasants the political and social causes of their millennial misery and exploitation, to make them “conscious” of their role in the revolutionary struggle. Political “study” became a technique for drawing out the suppressed resentments and hostility that are so much a part of peasant life in any underdeveloped society, and rationalized its release in terms of revolutionary goals. *Emotional manipulation* and “liberation” of the individual’s sense of injustice, outrage and hatred became the emotional basis of political participation in the Red Army and the Communist party. This highly emotional quality of political life became the second distinctive quality of Maoist politics. Thirdly, there was the development of elaborate and all-inclusive *organizational work* to control the individuals who had been mobilized through political study, channeling their actions in politically meaningful directions. And fourthly, individuals thus politically “conscious,” emotionally “liberated,” and organized were directed into repeated *political struggles*: not only the military conflicts that have been so much a part

of the Communists’ rise to power, but also struggles with each individual’s own “backward” thinking and the mistaken attitudes and behavior of his comrades.

This political formula was not something that Mao inherited fully developed from his Comintern mentors, or even from the early Chinese Communist leaders. It is a style of political action that evolved from years of trial and error in building a peasant party and army under the constant pressure of military campaigns and the threat of death. If we want to comprehend the depth of Mao’s continuing faith in this form of political action, it is necessary to recognize its undeniable effectiveness—in a period of intense social disruption—in taking politically passive peasants and turning them into highly motivated cadres of the revolution.

The first Communist peasant organizers, mostly young students from the cities, first tried to reach the peasants and draw them into the revolution on the basis of formal ideological doctrines learned from their urban professors. But the peasants were unmoved by pompous intellectual appeals; and their distrust of the young men in scholars’ gowns, based on their enduring awe of the literate official class, kept a “distance” between these early Party members and their would-be peasant allies.

It was finally the peasant insurrections of the mid-1920’s—triggered by natural disasters, the ravages of local warlords and the accumulated resentments of landlord exploitation—that exposed for Mao the key to the “boundless energy of the masses”: the fear of insecurity, the resentments and hatred of injustice and exploitation which, once liberated, could make the peasants a revolutionary force.

On the basis of his perception of this *emotional* basis of the peasants’ revolutionary energy, Mao set about constructing organizational forms and a style of political participation to mobilize peasant energy to the tasks of winning power. The particular quality of politics which we have come to associate with Communist China seems to be the sum of Mao’s efforts: the constant and highly

organized political study or "thought reform" sessions designed to make people "conscious" of their rage at exploitation by "telling bitterness" or "vomiting bitter water"; the highly emotional "struggle" meetings, where dunce-capped enemies of the revolution are confronted and accused by the masses; and the recurrent frantic periods of political *yun-tung* or mass campaign, where the entire population is worked up to a frenzy over some particular "counter-revolutionary," "revisionist," or "imperialist" enemy.

In sum, Mao developed organizational methods by which the Chinese, a people long taught to value "harmony" in social relations, would be forced to confront their enemies: their resentments and hatreds would be "liberated" and, thus mobilized, would become the driving force of China's social revolution.

The emotionalism and conflict characteristic of the Chinese revolution seem hardly unique if compared to revolutionary experiences of other times and places. Indeed, the Maoist formula for revolutionary action undoubtedly has its precedents. What does seem unique, however, is the fact that this particular style of political action has been maintained following the successful completion of the revolution of power. In the Western experience the successful attainment of power by a group of revolutionaries has tended to mean the institutionalization of social change, for the revolutions of our own tradition have proceeded on the basis of existing and indigenous social, economic and ideological changes. And the Western city has been the focus of these changes.

A BASIC DILEMMA

When the Communists attained power in China in 1949, however, with the success of the Maoist strategy of "encircling the cities from the countryside," the party leaders faced a fundamental dilemma: they had come to power committed to achieve national regeneration through industrialization; yet their society and economy remained predominantly peasant-based, and even their party, the vanguard of the working class, was less than 15 per cent worker in composition. Or, put in

other terms, the revolution of power had been completed before the development of the social and economic changes which would make the goals of industrialization and national unification attainable in the near future.

In the history of post-1949 Chinese Communist politics there has been constant debate over the most effective manner for resolving this dilemma. The period of China's First Five Year Plan, roughly covering the years 1953-1957, was a time of trial of the "Soviet" experience in economic modernization: development of heavy industry was emphasized and the importance of technical planners and those with scientific skills was stressed. This was a period when China's national defense policy stressed the creation of a modern army, hierarchically organized and equipped with the weapons of conventional warfare that are the products of a heavy and technical industrial base. This was a time when the city, and all it represents in social and intellectual terms, was the focus of China's drive for modernization.

Toward the end of the First Five Year Plan, however, the full effects of China's development dilemma—of the disparity between a peasant society and proletarian goals—became more evident. The nation's population was expanding rapidly, and with this expansion came a decrease in the margin of agricultural surplus which could feed the urban workers, provide raw materials for industry and earn foreign exchange for needed external purchases. The 1957 period of the "hundred flowers" criticism of the regime by the urban intellectuals must also have convinced Mao Tse-tung—a man who has long exhibited an almost irrational hatred for intellectual pretense—that the "bourgeoisie," the residents of the cities, were unreliable allies in the continuing tasks of the social revolution.

The party leadership's response to this set of frustrations was to turn against an "urban-centered," moderately paced, rational and technically-oriented approach to development. In the context of the "great leap forward," Mao Tse-tung invoked the leadership

techniques which had been painfully learned during the struggle for power, and which had brought the party to its 1949 victory. In mass-based and highly emotional assaults on the rural problems which continued to block China's modernization, peasants were organized into military formations for attacks on nature; party cadres, government workers and students were "sent down" (*hsia fang*) from the cities to work with the peasants in the countryside; and even the army was committed to economic tasks, as it had been in pre-"liberation" days. In short, the rural areas once again became the focus of China's revolution. The enemy was identified as the imbalance between an urban-based ruling class longing for the power and material wealth of the twentieth century, and a society still overwhelmingly peasant.

The subsequent failure of the "great leap" policies in the agricultural crisis of 1959–1962 did not solve the basic dilemma of China's social revolution; but it did call into question for many Chinese the appropriateness of Mao's revolutionary experience as a model for solving the country's economic and social problems. A crisis of authority thus grew in the soil of the crisis of agricultural production. The effects of this questioning of Mao's formula for social development has now fully exploded upon China and the world in the current "great proletarian cultural revolution." A leadership now fragmented over questions of proper policy for national regeneration fights within itself for the power to impose radically different solutions to China's development dilemma.

The depth and bitterness of the current leadership crisis in Communist China have astounded most of those who considered the "long march" generation of leaders to have been particularly cohesive and flexible in their discussion of policy. The extent of the present turmoil in China seems attributable to two factors. First, there is the seriousness of the policy issues which spawned the current crises. Not only a strategy for economic development, but national defense policy, Sino-Soviet relations, and China's posture toward the underdeveloped world and toward the

United States have all added fuel to the debate. Secondly, the issue of leadership succession—of who will succeed a partially discredited, or soon to be gone, Mao Tse-tung—has added a particularly bitter and personal quality to the present conflict. While Mao's opponents have been given little voice in the verbal hyperbole that has been part of the "cultural revolution" struggle, Mao himself at least makes it clear that he seeks to sustain the style of leadership and political action which brought him and the Communist party to power in China.

In mobilizing China's young people as "Red Guards" to struggle with those "representatives of the bourgeoisie who have wormed their way into the party and who want to bring about a restoration of capitalism in China," Mao is seeking to preserve a political style in which mass participation in highly emotional struggles with those burdened with China's traditional customs and habits, social thinking and culture will discipline the younger generation for the tasks of leading a continuing social revolution.

Persisting attacks on China's intellectuals and heightened efforts to educate the peasants in "socialist" culture indicate that Mao is also determined to make the countryside the continuing focus of China's revolution. In a very real sense, Mao is responding to the fact that China's revolution of power was achieved before the society had developed the social changes—the cultural shift from peasant to worker, the spread of functional literacy, the development of attitudes which will facilitate birth limitation and a high rate of savings, revisions in elite attitudes toward work and the use of power—which would make rapid modernization possible.

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The recent upheavals of "the cultural revolution" have made it harder than ever to get reliable statistics on China. This economist reviews the available facts and concludes that "Beneath all the shouting and pushing, there is the unresolved problem of feeding and clothing the millions. . . . The cultural revolution has in the last two years moved to the issues of the people's livelihood. . . ."

Communist China: The Economy and the Revolution

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COMMUNIST CHINA has published only one statistical manual: a slim, retrospective volume entitled *Ten Great Years*, covering the years 1949–1958. The figures for 1949–1952 are not very reliable because of the modest state of statistical science in the country at that time. The data for 1953–1957 (the First Five-Year Plan period) are probably the best of the lot, but even here numerous technical difficulties arise. Figures for 1958 (the first year of the "great leap forward," 1958–1960) were so exaggerated and fanciful that even the Chinese later declared them to be totally misleading. No comprehensive statistics have been published since 1959. Since 1966, the information blackout has been complete. One could go so far as to say that the amount of quantified information emanating from Peking in the last three years would fit comfortably on a sizable postage stamp.

For a while (1961–1965) the Mainland press carried much interesting discussion about the economy. Here and there one could pick up a suggestive datum, a hint on what was going on in the fields of agriculture, industry and trade. After 1965, this type of reportage was replaced by inspirational articles extolling the thoughts of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The language of these essays has become frozen by Maoist ritual. For

a time, a study of the provincial press yielded some valuable information on leadership attitudes, since it was one of the principal media through which instructions from the center were relayed to local authorities. In 1967, the export of provincial newspapers was banned. The Communist party's theoretical organ *Hung Chi* (*Red Flag*) ceased publication on November 23, 1967. In 1967 and early 1968, Red Guard wall posters could be resorted to in order to gain some idea as to the progress of events, but this source more often than not was contradictory and sensationalist. In any event, curbs were put on foreign correspondents' jotting down items from this wall literature.

Businessmen and tourists supplied some news but, here again, the information was of limited value. Travel routes were at all times strictly controlled, exception being made for Communist sympathizers and others whose conclusions about China had been arrived at beforehand. Following the outbreak of the "cultural revolution," the number of foreign visitors in China declined sharply.

There is, therefore, a serious problem here. Although Western economists have been trained by Stalin's secrecy complex to deal with this sort of censorship, the thoroughness of the informational blackout is unparalleled.

in the history of any modern nation. The figures used in the present article are Western estimates—informed guesses—based on tidbits of news issuing from the Mainland.

SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A number of general principles about the Chinese economy should be kept in mind.

The designation, "planned economy," does not apply to China. Like the rest of Chinese society, the economy in the past 19 years has been run by a series of short-term expedients, typically assuming the form of mass campaigns. The only period which fits the designation of planning is 1953–1957. Communist China's erratic course may be explained in various ways, among which policy disagreements within the top leadership should certainly be included. The major stages of shifting policy were the rehabilitation period (1949–1952), the First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), the liberal interlude (late 1956–1957), the great leap forward (1958–1960), the period of retrenchment and rebuilding (1961–1965), and the great proletarian cultural revolution (1966 to the present). Each stage contained a number of minor substages, some of them mutually contradictory. Each stage also revealed policy shifts from right to left and back again depending on whether emphasis was placed on economic calculation or ideological euphoria. The cultural revolution, for example, shows at least seven such swings in the revolutionary pendulum. To some extent, these movements are consciously directed by the leaders on the theory of alternating tension and relaxation. Increasingly, however, the swings appear to be spontaneous and uncontrollable.

Like other underdeveloped economies, the Chinese economy is not fully integrated. There is a considerable element of localism

and local self-sufficiency in the mechanism. To some extent this is a legacy of the past which the Communists have tried to eradicate. On the other hand, not a few measures taken by the Communists since 1958 have tended to encourage local economic autonomy. The interesting point about this is that it enables the economy to withstand upheavals at the center, to keep on functioning locally in spite of confusion at the top.¹

The Chinese economy is "aidless." It has never received any grants from abroad and the last long-term (Soviet) loan was received in 1954. China's external economic contacts are based on cash (mostly hard cash) payments and short-term credits for the purchase abroad of specified items. Two-thirds of the country's trade is presently carried on with "capitalist" powers.

At least since 1961, the Chinese economy has not been "Marxist-Leninist" in the Stalinist sense. In the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe the Stalinist economic priorities were—and to some extent still are—heavy industry, light industry, agriculture. China's official priorities after 1960 have been: agriculture, light industry, heavy industry. This departure from the orthodox pattern was largely dictated by the urgent need to feed and clothe a rapidly increasing population.

In evaluating the performance of China's economy one must constantly bear in mind the cultural gap between Western and Chinese conceptions of life. It is difficult enough to understand the workings of totalitarian systems when one has not been exposed to them directly and for considerable periods. It is even more difficult to grasp the elusive qualities of a totalitarian system imposed on a society whose values are very different from ours, and whose language loses more than the usual share of meaning in translation. There is no civil or criminal code in China today, nor are there any codes in other areas of law. The whole body of Chinese Communist law takes up just 600 pages of rather large print,² and most of the "laws" are, in fact, administrative decrees, many of them applying retrospectively. The General Code of Laws of the Ch'ing Dynasty made it a criminal of-

¹ See Jan S. Prybyla, "Why Communist China's Economy Has Not Collapsed After Two Years of Cultural Revolution," in J. S. Prybyla (ed.), *Communism at the Crossroads* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968).

² Albert P. Blaustein, *Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China* (South Hackensack, N.J.: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1962), and F. Kalinych, "Democracy and Legality," *Izvestia*, February 12, 1967, p. 4.

fense to "do what you ought not to do." The Chinese, moreover, have a capacity for separating the public from the private face, so that noisy expressions of obeisance on the part of private individuals must at all times be viewed not only in the context of a system of fear but in the light of a special ethic which existed long before Mao and Marx.

AGRICULTURE

At the end of December, 1966, the cultural revolution was extended to economic life. Red Guards and Maoist workers' formations ("revolutionary rebels") were ordered to take over offices, factories and farms. At this juncture, the upheaval in the "superstructure" (politics and cultural life) invaded the "base" (the economy). Since that time, there have been several shifts to the left and right, but the important point is that the revolutionary turmoil is now common to both political and economic life and directly affects the growing of grain and the making of steel.³

When all the interesting but rather extraneous matter is discarded, China's fundamental problem is seen to be what it has always been: how to feed and clothe a growing population. The economic answer to this problem lies in modernization, that is, the breaking out of the limits imposed on productivity by traditional methods of production, and the application of modern science and technology to the economic process. There are various ways in which this can be

done. However, because the margin between food and mouths to feed is extremely narrow, the range of options is for all practical purposes restricted to one: the development of agriculture. During the relatively pragmatic period, 1961–1965, the Chinese Communists recognized this constraint and applied themselves to promoting agriculture and industries directly serving agriculture, including light industries supplying the peasants with consumer goods. The importance of this sector is, of course, further enhanced by the fact that about 80 per cent of the Chinese people derive their living directly from the soil. Help from abroad must for the time being be ruled out.

There are two hard figures to go on. The first is the 1953 population figure of 583 million, the second is the grain output figure for 1957 which reads 185 million metric tons. Both figures seem reasonable and they have been repeatedly endorsed by official China. The rate of natural population increase since 1953 is subject to dispute. Estimates range from 1.4 to 2.5 per cent per annum.⁴ If the lower rate is taken, China's population in 1957 would be 615 million. The 2.5 per cent rate is probably too high. Taking a more reasonable rate of, say, 2 per cent per annum, the 1957 population would be 631 million. Assuming a 1957 population of 615 million and a domestic grain output of 185 million tons, the per capita grain availability in 1957 works out at 0.3 tons. If the 2 per cent rate is assumed, the per capita grain availability in 1957 would be 0.29 tons.

Now, if we assume that the average rate of population increase from 1953 to 1967 was 1.4 per cent per year, China's population in 1967 would be 707 million (and 770 million, if the 2 per cent per annum rate is assumed). Western estimates show that grain output in 1967 was 190–200 million metric tons.⁵ To this must be added 5 million metric tons of imported grain, giving either 195 or 205 million tons. Taking the lower population figure (707 million) and the higher grain availability figure (205 million tons), the per capita grain availability in 1967 works out at 0.29 tons. If the higher population figure

³ Jan S. Prybyla, "The Economic Cost," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1968, pp. 1–13.

⁴ R. M. Field, "How Much Grain Does Communist China Produce?" *The China Quarterly*, January-March, 1968, pp. 105–107; L. D. Tretiak, "Population Picture," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 4, 1968, p. 14.

⁵ The 1957 figure for population is based on the 1953 census. The 1957 figure for grain output is from *Ten Great Years*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 119. The 1967 grain figures are estimates by O. L. Dawson cited in E. F. Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic Revolution," in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China* (Washington: Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1967), Vol. I, p. 93; The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Review: China, North Korea, Hong Kong*, April, 1968, p. 7; and E. F. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 93. For further discussion of Mainland China's population problem, see the article by Thomas Dow, Jr., in this issue.

is taken (770 million) together with the higher grain figure (205 million tons), the result is a per capita grain availability of 0.27.

All this may sound involved, but the conclusion is simple: per capita grain availability in China was practically the same in 1967 as in 1957, and this on the most favorable assumptions. There appears to have been no visible improvement. It should be noted, of course, that the fact that the Chinese Communists have managed to keep up with population growth is in itself an achievement not shared by all underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, the result should be qualified at least in three ways.

The 1967 harvest was exceptionally good. In fact, the cultural revolution has so far unrolled in good weather, unlike the great leap forward. There are indications that in the last two years water conservancy projects have been neglected and that there has been an increase in illegal chopping down of trees by peasants. One is inclined to assume that the Chinese have not yet won their age-long battle against the elements, and that any serious adverse change in weather is likely to affect agricultural output in much the same way as it did in the past.

Grain distribution in 1957 was probably better than in 1967. One of the known effects of the cultural revolution has been the disruption of rail transport. It is possible, therefore, that local shortages of grain have developed and that this may, in turn, have repercussions on labor productivity and the production of livestock.

There have been reports of widespread theft from storage bins and of illegal distribution of grain to peasants by officials opposed to the Maoist line. It is also possible that the quality of storage has suffered and that, therefore, loss of grain in storage has been higher than in 1957.

One could validly object that grain availability is only one measure of food supply,

and that there are other commodities which should be taken into account. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and other agencies have tried to quantify the problem in face of official Chinese silence, but the results are at best tentative. It is possible to say, for example, that rice output, which was 86.8 million metric tons in 1957, reached about 88 million tons in 1966, that soybeans, which were at 10 million tons in 1957, reached perhaps 11 million tons in 1966, and that is all.⁶ It is possible that the increase in the output of grain crops and other crops was due in part to increased per acre yields—which would be reasonable in view of the increased application of chemical fertilizers—but the evidence at this stage is rather uncertain.

The overall conclusion which emerges is that a per capita grain availability of 0.3 metric tons or thereabouts represents a satisfactory present level, but that it will be increasingly difficult to maintain this level in the future unless (a) a determined effort is made to raise per acre yields, extend the cultivated area and keep floods and droughts in check, and (b) the natural population increase is brought under control. This demands some hard thinking unhindered by dialectical mysticism. There seems to be, frankly, very little room left for the kind of ideological calisthenics which the Chinese have enjoyed for the last three years.

A final note about clothing, which means primarily cotton. The Chinese these days are not given to conspicuous consumption in the matter of apparel. The millions are drably but cleanly dressed. Cotton output appears at present to be inadequate to cover anything but the most modest requirements of domestic consumers and state exports. Total cotton production in 1957 was 1.64 million metric tons. By 1966, it had probably declined to 1.3 million tons.⁷ If, as the Chinese claim, cotton output in 1967 was better than in the previous year (let us assume a 20 per cent improvement), it may now be roughly back where it was in 1957.

And so in this area too, there is little room left for ideological revivalism. There is

⁶ E. F. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 94 and Economist Intelligence Unit, *op. cit.*, *Annual Supplement 1968*, p. 5.

⁷ *Ibid.* Cf., *China News Analysis*, (Hong Kong), No. 691, January 12, 1968, pp. 1-7.

rather an urgent need for economic rationality, as Mao's Communist opponents have repeatedly said.

FOREIGN TRADE

China's foreign commerce is the one sector about which the outside world has relatively reliable information, simply because it is possible to get at trade figures issued by China's partners. The country's total imports and exports are in the \$3-\$4 billion range, which is not very much by world standards, but is crucial for China. Again, shorn of interesting but somewhat irrelevant incidentals, foreign trade is important for the Chinese because it enables them to get chemical fertilizers and chemical plants and some industrial equipment which they lack, as well as wheat to fill the gap between inadequate and minimum nutritional standards. The chemicals, plants and wheat come overwhelmingly from the Western industrial countries and Japan. Australia, Canada, Argentina and France are the major wheat suppliers. A million tons of imported wheat costs the Chinese \$50-\$60 million in hard currencies, so that the annual expenditure on this item runs these days into some \$250-\$300 million.

Since the wheat deals are settled in cash or on a short-term credit basis, the Chinese have to be very careful about their foreign exchange reserves and about the way their trade balance shapes up each year. What China's foreign exchange (i.e., hard currency reserve) position is at present, is anybody's guess, but there are clues.

The Chinese have at all times scrupulously settled their foreign debts, even in the face of unfraternal provocation by the Soviets. They have paid promptly and in full, thus establishing for themselves a good name, if not a credit rating, in the world. Mainland China today has no outstanding debts, except the usual short-term ones, which are settled in the normal way.

To pay for essential imports, the Chinese

have made a determined effort to promote exports of agricultural commodities (e.g., rice) and light industry products (e.g., cotton fabrics, cement, simple consumer goods).

China's foreign trade balance (commodity account) has usually been in slight surplus. In this way, a small inflow of foreign currencies has been assured over the years.

An important source of foreign exchange has been China's trade with Hong Kong. The Chinese supply most of the goods and services (including water) which the Hong Kong population needs daily and buy very little from the colony. The surplus is settled by Hong Kong in pounds sterling.

Invisible payments (i.e., the services account), such as freight and insurance and the servicing of loans, are settled by hard currency remittances from overseas Chinese. It is estimated that overseas Chinese remit about \$150 million to Mainland China every year, although the amount has no doubt fluctuated and has probably dropped to half that sum in each of the last three years.

In some years, recourse has been made by the Chinese to bullion sales, especially of silver. From 1959 to 1962, China sold in London about \$50 million worth of bullion, and there have been no sales since. In 1965 and 1966, the Chinese bought some gold in London, possibly as a hedge against the expected devaluation of the British pound, in which China's foreign exchange reserves are mainly held. China did not join in the rush on gold at the end of 1967 and in early 1968.⁸

Since the early 1950's, but especially after the break with the Soviet Union, the Chinese have extended credits to various non-Communist developing countries. Most of these loans have been tied to the delivery of Chinese-made goods, although there have been a few instances of emergency foreign exchange loans. As a rule, the loans are interest-free and directed to specific projects in the beneficiary countries.

One of the disturbing side effects of the cultural revolution has been a decline in Chinese exports and a concurrent rise in imports, resulting in a trade deficit of some \$50 million in 1966 and about \$200 million in 1967.

⁸ J. S. Prybyla, "Communist China's Foreign Exchange," *Queen's Quarterly*, Winter, 1965, pp. 519-527; Economist Intelligence Unit, *op. cit.*, (Annual Supplement, 1968), p. 11; *China Trade Report*, monthly issues.

The drop in exports is probably traceable in the first place to disruption in Chinese ports and confusion on the railroads, and also to production problems in industry. Less significantly, the cultural goings-on have strained China's relations with a number of trading partners, including Hong Kong.

Because of the continuing need to import wheat (in 1968 wheat imports are likely to exceed 6 million tons), there is here again no room for ideological exuberance. Most West European countries are eager to trade with Mainland China. Whether their eagerness will be rewarded depends to a considerable extent on China's ability to put her own house in order quickly. Even Mao Tse-Tung, in his brief spells of economic rationality, has come around to this view. A Red Guard poster in Canton quoted him as saying that

this nationwide disorder, including military disorder, is to occur for the very last time. After that, the nation will return to peaceful order, and the world will once more be in the hands of revolutionary rebels. The Central Government this time deliberately allows the existence of this nationwide disorder.⁹

There is a *non sequitur* in this (i.e., the revolutionary rebels are the agents of disorder), but it is at least more sober than the statement made by Wu Fa-hsien, Commander of the Air Force, in August, 1967: "in implementing Chairman Mao's directives we must completely disregard whether we understand them or not."¹⁰

INDUSTRY

Industry, as well as agriculture, has been plagued throughout 1967 and the better part of 1968 by problems of labor discipline. The authority of professional managers and local government officials in charge of plants, offices and farms has been undermined, and

in numerous instances the professionals have been replaced by inexperienced mixed committees of workers, rehabilitated cadres and the military. In addition, the workers have been torn by factional disputes, some siding with the Maoist revolutionary rebels, others with the anti-Maoist officials. By the latter part of 1967, the original issues had become blurred; personal vendettas appear to have been at least as important and frequent as ideological positions in causing clashes in factories and offices. The summer months of 1967 were especially violent and bloody; armed clashes were reported daily from most industrial centers, with the army intervening now on this side, now on that.¹¹ Instances of absenteeism and resort to go-slow tactics have often been mentioned in press, radio and wall poster reports.

It seems fairly clear that industrial production was little affected by the early ideological and power struggle phases of the cultural revolution in 1966. One gets the impression that output of most major industries in that year was somewhat better than in 1965, although this is exactly what it says: an impression. The Chinese have published no industry-wide production figures, and Western estimates are based on scattered information from various plants and localities and on the general tenor of the reports. It is possible that in 1966 China produced about 10 million tons of crude oil (1.5 million in 1957, and about 8 million tons in 1965), perhaps 40 million tons of iron ore (16 million tons in 1957), perhaps as much as 12 million

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⁹ Quoted in *Union Research Service* (Hong Kong), January 19, 1968, p. 80 from *Red Guards* (October 23, 1967) a newspaper edited by the Red Guard Combat Unit of the 4th Field Army, Red Guard Canton General Headquarters.

¹⁰ Quoted in L. D. Tretiak, "Less Fighting Talk," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 11, 1968, p. 46.

¹¹ See, for example, reports from the Chinese press in *Union Research Service*, January 16, 1968, p. 57 ff.

In this careful analysis of China's population trends and statistics, this sociologist shows that "it is difficult to imagine how the present agricultural system—with the highest rural densities in the world and the most primitive techniques of cultivation—is going to provide for a further increase of population."

The Population of China

BY THOMAS E. DOW, JR.

Field Associate, The Population Council

DESPITE ALL the rhetoric about her isolation, China obviously exerts an enormous influence upon the world community. Inevitably, the political and economic realities of our time draw us into an orbit of common concern over the destiny of China. This concern is grounded in the realization that in an interdependent world we all share a common fate. Thus China's prospects involve us all, as we strive—somewhat belatedly—for a better understanding of them.

There is no easy path to such an understanding, but certain variables are more useful than others in suggesting the broad limits within which the social, political and economic drama will be played out. Population—particularly the size and rate of growth of a nation—constitutes one such variable, especially because it exposes those basic human elements that affect all other variables. Accordingly, we shall try to explore the past and present dimensions of China's population, and to anticipate the probable course of future growth, evaluating demographic prospects in the light of China's family planning capacity and her economic needs.

The total population of China was not fully known prior to 1953. Such totals as existed for earlier periods were not arrived at

by systematic census procedures and are therefore more or less distorted reflections of the true population at any given time. Nevertheless, there are long series of historical enumerations—of varying quality—which can be suitably adjusted to suggest at least the most probable pattern of population growth prior to 1953. The following figures represent such a reconstruction¹:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population in millions</i>
1393	65
1600	150
1700	150
1779	275
1794	313
1850	430
1953	583

The total picture is clearly one of very erratic growth which can best be explained in terms of constant birth rates and variable death rates; that is, fertility was apparently more or less fixed at a high level throughout this entire period, while mortality fluctuated significantly as a consequence of changing political and economic conditions. When such conditions were favorable, population growth was sustained; when they were not, the population was barely able to maintain itself at existing levels.

But how relevant is this Malthusian picture of China's past for the postrevolutionary period? One would suspect that this historic pattern would be radically altered in a mod-

¹ Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 257-278.

ernizing society, altered in such a way as to produce entirely unprecedented problems of population growth and control. The 1953 census provides the first "clear" view of these new conditions.

THE 1953 CENSUS

In 1949 the political revolution in China was complete, but it was five years before its demographic dimensions were fully known. At the time of its initial success, the new leadership did not really know the size or growth-rate of the population.² This lack of information was considered particularly serious in view of the proposed economic reorganization of Chinese society and the obvious need for accurate demographic information in conjunction with this program. Accordingly, a full scientific census—the first in China's history—was planned for 1953, with the primary purpose of providing necessary statistics for use in national planning.

Having committed itself to the project, the government made strenuous efforts to ensure that the census would yield reliable data. It reorganized its statistical bureau, constructed a very simple schedule of questions, "trained" over 2.5 million enumerators to administer these questions and widely publicized the impending event. With this preparation, the census was launched in 1953; it continued for more than one year. The results, released on November 1, 1954, indicated a total mainland population of 583 million.

Naturally, the meaning of this figure is contingent on the validity of the census procedure. Admittedly, there were many difficulties connected with this initial attempt, and they necessarily reduce the level of confidence that one can place in the final results. Among these difficulties were:

The procedure requiring the head of the fam-

ily to report to the census office, rather than having the enumerator visit the home;

The protracted length of the enumeration, on the one hand, and the political necessity of finishing the enumeration by an arbitrary date, on the other;

The joining of the census to a voter registration scheme, so that the same enumeration served demographic and political purposes;

and, finally, the dubious quality of the training received by official and unofficial enumerators.

All these factors and others undoubtedly contributed to a considerable but unknown degree of error, and perhaps warrant the conclusion that the census did not achieve the level of accuracy one expects of a modern scientific survey.

Yet other evidence suggests that these errors were not excessive, and that the resulting count was a fairly accurate reflection of total population size. Most significant in this connection was the survey carried out in 1953 to verify the accuracy of the census figures. The results suggest low levels of both omission and duplication, with an excess of the former over the latter. From this one can infer a probable slight underenumeration in the total census.

On balance, it seems reasonable to conclude that the population of mainland China on June 30, 1953, was at least 583 million. Arguments to the contrary, especially those suggesting a considerably lower total,³ do not seem persuasive in view of the available evidence. In particular, the argument that the Chinese government deliberately inflated this figure for political or ideological purposes appears to be largely without foundation. On the contrary, "all the available evidence . . . indicates that the Government . . . is proceeding in all its economic planning on the basis of the 1953 census figures."⁴

In some ways, the 1953 census paints a familiar picture. Life is rural, just under nine out of every ten people live on the land; life is crowded, three out of every four people are contained within 15 per cent of the nation's total area—and this is as it has always been. Less continuous with the past are the statistics concerning population growth.

² Population estimates during this early period indicated progressively larger totals, but these figures were not considered reliable by the government.

³ See Colin Clark, "La Population de la Chine Depuis 1915," *Population* (November–December, 1966), pp. 1191–1199.

⁴ S. Chandrasekhar, *China's Population* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 34.

Beginning in 1952, and continuing for the next five years, the government made a concerted effort to register all births and deaths in China. The results for 1953 indicate a birth rate of 37 and a death rate of 17.⁵ Appropriate adjustment of these rates would probably result in their being increased somewhat to compensate for underreporting. Nevertheless, the spread between them, that is, the excess of births over deaths, seems a plausible — if somewhat conservative — estimate of the growth situation in China in 1953. It represents a dramatic departure from the historical situation, in which the growth rate could hardly have been this great. Ping-ti Ho estimates, for example, that the growth rate had never before reached even one per cent per year, much less the two per cent level reported for 1953.⁶ This higher rate indicates that by 1953 the revolutionary regime had succeeded in making significant inroads against mortality without achieving comparable reductions in fertility. This condition would seem to apply with even greater force in the years following the census.

POPULATION GROWTH BETWEEN 1953 AND 1968

If we assume that the birth rate has not fallen since 1953, i.e., that it is 40 or more,⁷ while the death rate has declined from more than 25 to less than 20, it is obvious that the average yearly growth rate for the period 1953–1968 has been at least 2 per cent. This suggests a minimum population of 750 million in 1965, with a probable increase to approximately 800 million by 1968.

⁵ Birth rates and death rates are in terms of 1,000 of the population per year. Rates of natural increase often expressed as a percentage represent the difference.

⁶ Ho, *op. cit.*, pp. 270–277.

⁷ See Irene B. Taeuber and Leo A. Orleans, "Mainland China," in Bernard Berelson (ed.), *Family Planning and Population Programs* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 38.

⁸ Recent Chinese figures published in the *Züricher Zeitung*, April 26, 1968, report a population total of approximately 700 million for 1967.

⁹ Roland Pressat, "The Present and Future Demographic Situation in China," in United Nations, *Proceedings of the World Population Conference*, Vol. II, *Fertility, Family Planning, Mortality* (New York, 1965), pp. 32–33.

Of course, it is possible that severe disruption, attending the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution," may have prevented the population from reaching this level. But in fact it seems unlikely that these disturbances were sufficient to produce either a marked acceleration in death or a marked decrease in birth. Violence was apparently limited in both instances, and sporadic agricultural deficiencies were offset by food imports. Even if one accepts the argument that excess mortality existed in 1959–1961 and in 1966–1967, it would certainly not have dampened the growth of population below the United Nations current estimate of 728 million.⁸ Thus all reasonable assumptions concerning population growth between 1953 and 1968 suggest a present total of between 700 and 800 million Chinese, with the latter figure being, in my opinion, the more persuasive estimate. This represents an increase of over 200 million in a 15-year period and is without historical precedent; at no time in the 30 centuries of China's history has the population grown this rapidly. Under these circumstances, one looks ahead with considerable trepidation.

FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH

In the future as in the past, population growth will be greatly influenced by coexistent political and economic developments. Recognizing the high degree of contingency surrounding such events, and the difficulty of accurately appraising their effect on mortality and fertility, it is useful to indicate some alternate demographic models.

Two basic lines of reasoning are possible: on the one hand, we may assume a continuity in birth and death rates from the 1953–1954 period; or, on the other hand, we may imagine substantial changes in one or both vital processes. In the latter case, most projective models assume continuing progress in mortality control—either gradual or rapid—which is then analyzed in conjunction with either constant or declining fertility. Within the range of these assumptions, the resulting population could be as high as two billion or as low as one billion by the year 2000.⁹ At-

tainment of the higher figure would suggest sustained fertility and controlled mortality, while realization of the lower total would require a rapid decline in the birth rate or a considerable increase in mortality.

In fact, of course, no such increase in the death rate is anticipated in these projections and, because of this assumption, both the high and low estimates for the year 2000 may prove to be excessive; that is, an unprecedented increase in mortality would make all of our present projections too high. Fortunately, such a prospect does not appear likely, and we may proceed on the assumption that China's future population growth will depend primarily on the level of fertility. But what will this level be? If we assume that fertility control is possible in China, then the answer will depend on how the Chinese evaluate the unprecedented population increases of the last 15 years and the probable consequences of similar increases in the future. Our own evaluation of this question follows.

POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

China's search for the modern economic way has been largely guided by Marxist navigational principles. According to this world view, people are the basic source of a nation's wealth. Therefore, there cannot be too many people; there can only be exploitative economic systems which demand "surplus" labor and create the impression of overpopulation. Such contradictions naturally disappear when an economic system maximizes its human capital and eliminates the specter of redundant population.

So reads the gospel according to Marx. But is it relevant to the problems of China? That is, has China been able to utilize successfully its demographic wealth in such a way as to ensure a rising standard of living to all its citizens; or has the flow of human resources been greater than the absorptive power of the

economy, with the result that per capita gains have been less rapid than they would have been under different demographic circumstances? The facts of the last 20 years provide a rather clear answer to this question.

In the agricultural sector, for example, increasing rural population has been channeled primarily into the existing system of labor-intensive rice cultivation, with the overall result of higher yields per unit of land: more agricultural workers have increased the productivity of presently cultivated land; but, as one might suspect, *output per worker has been low*. Moreover, in spite of increases in productivity, the total agricultural output has been barely sufficient to keep up with population growth. Annual food imports have been necessary over most of the last decade just to keep food consumption at a minimum level of 1,900 calories per day. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how the present agricultural system—with the highest rural densities in the world and the most primitive techniques of cultivation—is going to provide for a further increase in population. It is even more difficult to imagine how 85 per cent of this anticipated increase is to be absorbed into the agrarian labor force without further reducing the productivity of the individual cultivator.

Responding to these pressures, the government embarked on a program of bringing new land under cultivation and transferring "excess" population to such areas. Unfortunately, the growth of population was so great and the costs of land reclamation so high that the program provided no real solution to either the demographic or the agricultural problem and was abandoned.¹⁰ In its place there may be a growing realization that agricultural production cannot successfully compete with the present rate of population growth, and that radical increases in per capita production and per capita food consumption will require structural changes in the total economy which are not dependent upon the present labor-intensive techniques.

In many ways the industrial sector of the economy is subject to similar demographic

¹⁰ H. Yuan Tien, "The Demographic Significance of Organized Population Transfers in Communist China," *Demography*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1964), pp. 220-226.

pressures, in that it must try to provide employment opportunities for both the urban born and the urban migrant. It has certainly failed to do so in the case of the city-bound farmer, whose quest for urban employment ends with a one-way ticket back to the countryside; and it is foundering in its attempt to provide for the high rate of natural increase in urban areas. What this means, basically, is that the growth of industry has not been rapid enough to absorb all the urban unemployed—no less the rural underemployed—and it is not likely to “catch up” at the present rate of population growth.

From a demographic point of view the problem is simply that the revolutionary regime has produced a rapidly growing population and is beginning to harvest the consequences of its “success.” The children of the revolution are now growing up in greater numbers than ever before and making increasing demands upon the society; demands—for food, clothing, housing, medical services, education and employment—which must be met if the standard of living is to be maintained or improved. Whether these needs will be met depends in large measure on the numbers that must be accommodated. In the case of China, the numbers are huge, and the problem is already serious. And it is likely to grow worse as these young people begin to form families of their own and contribute to an even larger wave of demographic pressure.¹¹

In spite of this ominous prospect, the government has been reluctant fully or consistently to acknowledge that most of its socio-economic problems would be greatly simplified by a reduction in the rate of population growth. This reticence is consistent with China’s ideological position—which denies the possibility of either overpopulation or

serious economic limitations under communism—and can only be understood in this context. Thus the irrational excesses of the “great leap forward” and the “cultural revolution,” the corruption of the statistical system, and the complementary failure to collect or make public any significant demographic statistics after 1957 are all symptomatic of this position. They all represent in differing degrees an attempt to escape from demographic reality, indeed from all reality, when that reality conflicts with the ideological blueprint. It is a magical process in which the awkward straw of demographic and economic existence is woven into gold by the alchemy of statistical fraud and then, as John Aird suggests, one comes to believe in the gold instead of the straw.¹²

This ideological obsession was almost fatal in 1958–1960, and showed signs of being so again in 1966–1967. Fortunately, these irrational tides now seem to be receding, as the government tries to get out of its ideological looking-glass and back into the world. What this calls for, in the context of modernization, is a frank admission that the addition of too many people in too short a time constitutes a severe restraint for economic development under *any* ideological system. That the government has neither fully accepted nor fully rejected this relationship is evident in the rather strange history of China’s family planning program.

POPULATION POLICY

Since 1949, China’s population policy¹³ has followed a very erratic course, with high birth rates and rapid population increase being alternately encouraged or discouraged in keeping with the prevailing interpretation of Marxist ideology. Specifically, pro- and anti-natal programs have been associated, respectively, with the rising and falling tides of economic and political orthodoxy. This relationship between ideology and demographic action defines and explains the otherwise unintelligible movements and contradictions of China’s population policy. Its specific workings can be observed in the following analysis.

In the first blush of revolutionary success,

¹¹ See Taeuber and Orleans, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–40.

¹² John S. Aird, “China: A Demographic Crisis,” in The Population Reference Bureau, *Population Bulletin* (August, 1963), p. 133.

¹³ Perhaps the best analysis of China’s population policy between 1949 and 1962 is offered by John S. Aird, “Population Policy in Mainland China,” *Population Studies*, XVI (July, 1962), pp. 38–57. I have accepted his general conclusions in the following discussion.

the Chinese leaders were not prepared to acknowledge the problem of overpopulation. In loyalty to Marx, they affirmed the primacy of human resources in the production of wealth, and denied the possibility of excess population. The success of the revolution would be confirmed by the simultaneous and complementary growth of population and prosperity. Accordingly, the importation of contraceptives was prohibited, and the opportunity for legal abortion was eliminated—all this in spite of the fact that the population was already approaching 600 million—570 million was a precensus estimate—and was likely to grow even larger. Clearly, the threat of overpopulation was present even at this early date, and yet the leadership's first response was to deny the existence of the problem. Fortunately, this attitude would begin to change under the cumulative pressure of external events.

The first reliable count of China's total population was provided by the 1953 census. In view of the results, it must have had a sobering influence on the Chinese leadership. Nevertheless, it was still assumed that these great numbers would produce in excess of their consumption, with inevitable accumulation, investment and economic growth. Yet, as the years passed, and the population continued to grow, more voices were raised questioning the validity of this assumption. By 1956, with mounting evidence of agricultural shortages, unemployment and general economic stagnation, even the government seemed ready reluctantly to accept the fact "that population growth did indeed threaten to outrun national economic development and exceed the increase in food production."¹⁴

As a result of this awareness, a major birth control program was introduced in 1956. It proceeded with great enthusiasm, but achieved little in the way of results. What it might ultimately have accomplished, we shall never know. It was abruptly canceled

in July, 1958. The program was a victim not of its own inadequacies—as great as they may have been—but rather of a return to economic and political orthodoxy. Ideology was again in the saddle.

Disturbed by the criticisms of the "hundred flower" period in 1957, and disappointed by the pace of its various development programs, the government seemed determined to reassert the revolutionary fervor of the earlier years. The primacy of man as a productive unit in the transformation of his environment was once again acknowledged as an article of absolute faith. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to admit that large numbers could be anything but an asset in the process of rapid development. Such a philosophy rendered population control unnecessary and undesirable. By ideological fiat, the population problem was declared null and void.

This break with demographic and economic reality brought with it a short period of euphoria, during which agricultural and industrial production apparently increased sharply, as if to confirm the prophecy of the "great leap forward." But the successes were short-lived, and the transcendent ambitions of the period were soon destroyed by the reality of millions of people who could not live in the Marxian wilderness any longer. In short, the government's utter disregard of external events brought the nation to the brink of dissolution. Faced with this ultimate catastrophe, the ruling elite managed to pull back from the abyss; they were ready to conform to the real world as the price of survival.

This return to reason involved the quiet resumption of the birth control program and the admission that "planned parenthood . . . is conducive to raising the people's standard of living."¹⁵ The government's increasing encouragement of late marriage, postponement

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¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁵ Premier Chou En-lai, as quoted in J. C. Caldwell (ed.), *The Population of Tropical Africa* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1968), p. 356.

Reviewing China's attitude toward the Western world, this author points out that "Common sense suggests to the Chinese pragmatists . . . that there can be no reconciliation between Peking and Washington until . . . the issue of Formosa is settled, and that, even then, the United States in accord with its present thinking would continue in its efforts to contain China and police Asia." As Mao's power declines, it is likely "that in the end, barring a nuclear Armageddon, the American-as-Western strategy of containment of China must fail."

China and the Western World

BY O. EDMUND CLUBB

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ANCIENT IMPERIAL China rested comfortably in the assurance that she constituted the unique civilization, *t'ien hsia* (equivalent to "the world"). There was indeed a "Western Region," but that was in Central Asia; there was no "Western world." It was with the coming of Europeans in ships from *hsi yang*, the Western Seas, that the concept of the Western world dawned on the Chinese. The Europeans who came by land—the Russians—were at first deemed somehow different, in the same general category as the Mongols and other peoples of Inner Asia. Only when Imperial Russia obtained for herself the same privileged position as the seafarers—upon the rounding off of the "unequal treaty" system in 1858–1860—did she too become fully associated, in Chinese eyes, with the seafaring Westerners. The empire-builders were then viewed as one.

In the Republican period, from 1912 to 1949, China remained in large measure a projection of the imperial past, with ways set over a period of two thousand years. This was especially true in the field of foreign relations. The frustrating experience of being subjected to various political incursions and legal subordinations within the unequal-treaty system brought China into her Republican period with an abiding conviction that she

had been deeply wronged by the Westerners. This belief only reinforced a congenital Great Han chauvinism, and buttressed the Republican urge to reassert Chinese power and cause China to resume her "rightful" position of preeminence in Asia. In consequence, Chinese leaders from 1912 onwards have generally been perfervid nationalists.

There was an early gain when Germany, defeated in World War I, lost completely her position of privilege and power in China, and when Russia, transformed by revolution, gave up most—but not all—of her special rights and interests in China. Those developments left in being a considerable residue of foreign rights and privileges, once more held chiefly by the Western sea powers and by Japan. Republican China's foreign policy was directed consistently toward the destruction of the unequal-treaty system, with her driving urge, especially from 1919 onwards, embodied in the concept of "anti-imperialism."

There were certain notable characteristics of the country's foreign policy of the period: 1) Republican Chinese customarily aligned themselves with foreign powers with the aim of getting the better part of a bargain, not with the intent of bearing an equal share of a burden; 2) they were consistently quick to turn their backs on an alliance if they saw a

more profitable alternative; and 3) a variety of governments at Peking and Nanking—like the Manchu Court before them—committed egregious errors in foreign policy and thus involved the country in deep trouble.

THE CHIANG KAI-SHEK REGIME

Chiang Kai-shek ruled in Republican China longer than any of his many rivals for power, and his formulation and administration of foreign policy offer a useful case history. Writing when allied not to revolutionary Russians but to conservative Americans, he laid claim to the territory controlled by the Manchus 100 years earlier: “not until all lost territories have been recovered can we relax our efforts to wipe out this humiliation and save ourselves from destruction.”¹ And what was the cause of China’s present weakness? Chiang offered the conventional Chinese answer in the twentieth century:

The deterioration of China’s national position and the low morale of the people during the last hundred years can be largely attributed to the unequal treaties.²

With this as background, Chiang stated the Chinese case:

Frankly speaking the cause of war is imperialism. Therefore, I believe that the end of the Second World War must also mark the end of imperialism. Only then can the permanent peace of the world be firmly assured.³

In service of his political philosophy and ambitions, Chiang Kai-shek at various times leaned very heavily upon the Soviet Union, Germany and the United States *in seriatim* for aid—and unfortunately by miscalculation came into grave conflict with Soviet Russia and Japan in particular. His alliance with the United States by no manner of means ran smoothly, but in the end it was the only alternative left to him, and he remains on the American side still, to the benefit of his Nationalist regime, in the Formosan refuge to which the Communists drove him in 1949.

¹ Chiang Kai-shek, *China’s Destiny and Economic Theory*, with notes and commentary by Philip Jaffe (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947), p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 232–35.

CHIANG’S SUCCESSOR

Chiang’s successor to power on the mainland, Mao Tse-tung, was nurtured in the same Republican Chinese politics. Like Chiang, he was a part of that Kuomintang-Communist combine that brought the People’s Revolutionary Army to the Yangtze in 1926, with Sun Yat-sen’s “anti-imperialism” one of the main motive forces. There were indeed ideological as well as factional differences between Mao the Communist and Chiang the Nationalist, but there were fewer regarding foreign policy objectives than in the field of domestic affairs.

Chinese Communist foreign policy from the beginning has been largely the creation of Mao Tse-tung, but even in that form it has been a composite of three chief elements: traditional ethnocentric concepts regarding foreign affairs; pragmatic reaction to contemporary situations in foreign affairs; and, finally, that strange concoction, with its fine-spun philosophical theorizing often so removed from the world as it exists, the “Thought of Mao Tse-tung.”

Mao, as inflexible in his governing concepts as his Confucian or Republican predecessors, has nonetheless prided himself on the flexibility of his tactics. His theory of contradictions assumes that all progress flows from the interaction of contrary forces. Struggle therefore has become the rule of Chinese existence. In the foreign as in the domestic field, “uninterrupted revolution” has become the ideal; and the operative principle is that embodied in Mao’s theory of protracted warfare.

Mao’s belief in the overall efficacy of war for the solution of humanity’s political problems was set forth long ago, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, when he propagated the idea that war would be ended only by opposing counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war—at all levels. He said, with his genius for oversimplification:

History knows only two kinds of war, just and unjust. We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just. . . . The

biggest and most ruthless of unjust counter-revolutionary wars is hanging over us, and the vast majority of mankind will be ravaged unless we raise the banner of mankind's salvation. . . . A war waged by the great majority of mankind and of the Chinese people is beyond doubt a just war, a most lofty and glorious undertaking for the salvation of mankind and China, and a bridge to a new era in world history. When human society advances to the point where classes and states are eliminated, there will be no more wars, counter-revolutionary or revolutionary, unjust or just; that will be the era of perpetual peace for mankind.⁴

Mao's revolutionary messianism enters naturally into his foreign policies. In August, 1946, the month after the beginning of the Communist "third revolutionary civil war" that was to bring victory over the Nationalists, he set forth some concepts depreciating both modern armaments and a great power such as the United States—which was currently aligned with Chiang Kai-shek. Talking to American journalist Anna Louise Strong, he noted that

The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons.

He went on to generalize: "All reactionaries are paper tigers."⁵

The smashing Communist defeat of the Nationalists only reinforced Mao's faith in his infallibility. In the course of the War of Resistance against Japan, he had upon occasion voiced amiable sentiments toward China's American and British allies; but with accession to full power in China, Mao's political affection was transferred in a definitive fashion to the Soviet Union. In his cele-

brated essay of June 30, 1949, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," he publicly declared himself in favor of alignment with Soviet Russia rather than with the "imperialist" powers. He said that China had to choose between one alignment or the other: there was no third road. But he justified his dictum more on pragmatic than on ideological grounds.

Would the present rulers of Britain and the United States, who are imperialists [he asked] help a people's state? Why do these countries do business with us and, supposing they might be willing to lend us money on terms of mutual benefit in the future, why would they do so? Because their capitalists want to make money and their bankers want to earn interest to extricate themselves from their own crisis—it is not a matter of helping the Chinese people.⁶

Now the principle of anti-imperialism was again being put to the fore in China, in a changed Far Eastern power relationship. In defeat, Japan had lost her empire, and the Western seafarers had either given up their colonies or were in the process of being compelled to do so. Among the sea powers, only the United States retained substantial military strength in the West Pacific. And the structure of the West, with relation to China, was further weakened when, beginning with British action in January, 1950, various Occidental states recognized the new government, and France—engaged in trying to restore her colonial authority over Indochina—and the United States, did not. Given its prior relationship to the Nationalists and in view especially of the power it wielded in the near neighborhood of China, the United States automatically became, in Mao's eyes, China's Enemy Number One.

China embarked upon the road to power. She harassed the consular establishments of ex-treaty powers to bring about a reduction of their prestige and number—and the closure of those belonging to nonrecognizing powers. Upon the "requisitioning" of the American consular office at Peking, the United States withdrew all of its consular and diplomatic personnel from China. Mao's regime went on to force the closing, at heavy loss, of foreign

⁴ Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," December, 1936, in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), pp. 75–150, p. 79. If the text suggests that Mao foresaw clearly the shape of an impending World War II, it is to be remarked that he can never be safely given full credit for prescience shown in a late edition of a particular work, given his inveterate habit of literary revisionism.

⁵ *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 4 vols. (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1961), Vol. IV, p. 100.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

business enterprises. It prohibited further foreign missionary activity or financial support in the China field. And, with remarkable effectiveness, it sustained revolutionary movements on its periphery, intervened in the Korean War, and helped the Vietminh in Indochina—all in furtherance of its campaign against imperialism. Then, having discovered the limits of safe action in the first Formosa Strait crisis of 1954–1955, Peking sent Premier Chou En-lai to the Bandung Conference, and the spirit of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation settled over the seaside periphery of China.

Peking's 1955 policy shift was patently responsive to a new major confrontation with the West, in the person of the United States. In early 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had enunciated the doctrine of "massive retaliation" vis-à-vis China and had gone on, at the end of the year, to sign a treaty of alliance with the Chinese Nationalist faction on Formosa, which thus became a link in the American "island defense chain" in the West Pacific. The United States was then in full occupation of the assigned role of "the greatest imperialist of them all."

The Bandung spirit governed at Peking for a time. But it offered only peace, not the rapid progress toward power and preeminence desired by the impatient Mao Tse-tung. He discovered that the Soviet Union was not, after all, prepared to give as much help to his "people's state" as he felt China deserved—and needed. His effort at domestic breakthrough by the revolutionary magic of the "Great Leap," and the coup designed to achieve a breakout from the American encirclement by means of the second Formosa Strait Crisis of 1958, were both failures. When his dispute with Moscow led to the breach of 1960 and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's limited, but critical, economic (and political) assistance, the harsh limitations on China's power potential loomed larger than ever. The die was cast in July, 1963, when a Moscow conference of delegates from the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties broke up on the rock of China's demand for policy changes. From the Maoist

point of view, the Soviet Union had proved itself an unreliable supplier. China could, and did, undertake a program of "self-reliance," but substitute suppliers had also to be found.

THE INTERMEDIATE ZONE

In these circumstances, in January, 1964, Peking evolved the doctrine of the "intermediate zone," which designated the United States as the enemy not only of China but of the rest of the world: the "intermediate zone" lying between the Communist bloc and the United States—made up of 1) industrialized nations and 2) developing nations—was also threatened by American imperialism, and would thus provide natural allies in accord with the "united front" concept used before on occasion by Mao Tse-tung against the "enemy of mankind." This concept provided justification for the increase both of political and of economic contacts with countries previously dubbed "imperialist"; moreover it could be expected to divide the Westerners to some degree. In that same January, Peking and Paris agreed on a procedure for the effective diplomatic recognition of China by France. The event was a milestone.

But this device obviously did not provide for rapid progress toward the creation of the kind of a world desired by Mao Tse-tung, and Peking's diplomacy with respect to the second sector of the "intermediate zone" was directed toward the achievement of political leadership. China set out to develop a world position of her own, apart from the Communist bloc. It would appear that Mao still thought that his East Wind was destined to prevail over the West Wind, that the hour had struck when there would be waged that "just war for mankind" which would constitute "a bridge to a new era in world history" wherein classes and states would be no more.

The Maoist strategic aim was now more than the recovery of the Manchu power position in Asia: it envisaged the creation of a dominating world position for China through the expansion of revolution in the Maoist model. In September, 1965, Defense Minister Lin Biao set forth the doctrine in full

bloom:⁷ North America and Western Europe constituted the "cities of the world"; Asia, Africa and Latin America were "the rural areas of the world"; and in the contemporary world revolution, the rural areas were encircling the cities. The Maoist urge was clear without detailed exposition: the underdeveloped agricultural countries (under Chinese leadership) would conquer and would almost certainly "justly" expropriate the rich, industrialized nations of the world. This interpretation clearly incorporated a threat to the political positions of other states in the intermediate zone, a threat that had not been contained in the January, 1964, formulation. Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, in a press conference of September 29, gave expression to the threat. Referring to the "great possibility" that the United States would extend the war from Vietnam to China itself, he said that the Chinese people were ready to make the supreme sacrifice, adding:

We welcome them [the U.S. imperialists] to come, to let the Indians come with them, to let the British imperialists come with them, to let the Japanese militarists come with them.

He expanded his sweeping defiance to include the Soviet Union: "Let those revisionist leaders coordinate the attack from the north. Even then, we'll win victory. . . ."⁸

It was still noteworthy that Ch'en's extravagant phrasing indicated that China felt herself on the defensive. Defense Minister Lin had reached the conclusion that, if World War III occurred, many hundreds of millions more people would turn to socialism, "and it is possible that the whole structure of imperialism will collapse." It was a satisfying apocalyptic vision for backward, problem-ridden China; but Lin obviously was not certain that it would come to pass.

The enunciation of the Lin Piao *cum* Mao

Tse-tung doctrine must be viewed against the background of other highly significant developments of that critical period. China had exploded her first atomic device in October, 1964—but for the time being this meant only that she had automatically become a prime nuclear target. China's enemy, the United States, had begun the systematic bombing of North Vietnam in early February of 1965. About a week later, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi effectively demanded that the Soviet Union adopt China's militant line against American "aggression," saying, in a speech at the Soviet Embassy at Peking, that

Only in concrete action against United States imperialism and its followers can the Chinese-Soviet alliance be tested and tempered and Chinese-Soviet unity be consolidated and developed.⁹

The "concrete action" could mean nothing less than an overt Soviet challenge to American nuclear power. Moscow refused the challenging assignment of staging a nuclear confrontation over Vietnam. In June, the United States introduced its own ground forces into combat in South Vietnam, thus transforming the Vietnam civil war into an American war abutting directly against Chinese territory.

The national issue confronting the Peking leadership was clear: in the absence of Soviet aid, where should China find help for defense against the American presence looming on the immediate horizon? The campaign to obtain a quick Afro-Asian mobilization against the United States (and the Soviet Union) under Chinese leadership had already collapsed¹⁰; and Britain, France, West Germany and Japan, while developing their commerce with China, were not to be regarded as potential janissaries for Mao Tse-tung's struggle with American power—especially since Lin Piao had marked them, too, for ultimate destruction.

The year 1965 saw yet another important, if little-known, event. In September, *after* the appearance of the Lin Piao article, the central committee of the Chinese Communist party met in extraordinary session at which,

⁷ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" *Peking Review*, September 3, 1965, pp. 9-30. For excerpts, see also *Current History*, September, 1966.

⁸ *Peking Informers*, October 16, 1965, pp. 5-6.

⁹ *The New York Times*, February 16, 1965.

¹⁰ See G. H. Jansen, Postponement of the 'Second Bandung,'" *World Today*, September, 1965, pp. 398-406.

seemingly (no official report of the proceedings was published), there occurred a fateful collision between Mao the Great Jacobin and the pragmatists—the “organization men”—on the issue of foreign policy. The pragmatists sought a practical means of extricating China from the dangerous situation into which she had been led by Mao Tse-tung.¹¹ They apparently advocated retreat to a more moderate and safer position. Mao, however, was governed not by common logic but by revolutionary idealism; and he was evidently determined not to make peace with either “imperialists” or “modern revisionists”—except, of course, on his terms. It was appropriate, in China’s circumstances, that he should shortly adopt as one of the inspirational guides for the Chinese nation the fable of “The Old Man Who Moved Mountains.” Governed by his “Yenan complex,”¹² Mao once more proposed to perform miracles of prowess at the age of 72. He began by undertaking a broad purge of his opposition within the Chinese Communist party.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The vehicle for Mao’s purge was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which was set in motion, without being named, subsequent to the September meeting. After the progressive ousting of various critics of his policies, Mao formally launched the movement in August, 1966. It was caparisoned with an idealism related specifically to the

Chinese domestic scene, but there was an easy inference: Mao’s revolutionary dynamism was expected to overflow China’s political borders, so that in time the whole world would be revolutionized.¹³ And in Peking, in fact, according to a report from the Soviet press agency, *Tass*, it was proposed in late 1966 that there be established a Red Guards International for non-Chinese, with the prerequisite for membership being the recognition of Mao Tse-tung as “head of the world revolution” and his ideology as “the summit of Marxism-Leninism.”¹⁴

It was in that situation that there were attacks on the unregenerate “West,” for imperialism or revisionism, and also on practically everyone else with whom Peking had some contact. The United States, not being represented in Peking, was out of reach, but in late January, 1967, after an incident involving Chinese students in Moscow, the Soviet embassy in Peking became the target of Red Guard attacks. The Red Guards attacked other Occidentals—East Europeans, the French, and the Yugoslavs—and in the course of 1967 they also assaulted the diplomatic missions of various Asian countries.

But the main targets remained the “imperialist” British (because of Hong Kong) and the “revisionist” Soviets. In mid-August, Red Guards invaded the Soviet embassy’s consular section and destroyed furniture and documents; and then, during the night of August 22, they invaded the British diplomatic compound, burned the chancery and damaged other buildings, and beat British Chargé Donald C. Hopson and other British nationals. Moscow journals characterized

(Continued on page 177)

¹¹ For a consideration in some depth of the contemporary debate over military policy, see Franz Schurmann, “What’s Happening in China?” *New York Review of Books*, October 20, 1966, pp. 18–25; also, the Peking news despatch of David Oancia, *Toronto Globe and Mail*, as carried by *The New York Times*, August 13, 1966.

¹² See Mark Gayn, “Peking Has a Yen-an Complex,” *The New York Times Magazine*, January 30, 1966, pp. 10–74, *passim*.

¹³ For perceptive surveys of the origins and motivations of this movement, see Harrison E. Salisbury, *The New York Times*, August 14, 1966; Jacques Guillermaz, “La révolution culturelle chinoise,” *Notes et Etudes Documentaires, Problèmes Chinois*, No. 2 (September 20, 1967); pp. 22–26; for a later survey, see Chalmers Johnson, “China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (January, 1968), pp. 1–15.

¹⁴ *Asian Recorder*, October 29–November 4, 1966, p. 7360.

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Describing the changing relationship between China and Japan, this author notes that "Sino-Japanese relations no longer follow the pre-1960 pattern. The Chinese do not provide the key Japanese market; geographical proximity is no longer the magnet of centuries past . . . ; and younger Japanese no longer have the feelings for this unfamiliar China which their ancestors possessed."

China and Japan: A Matter of Options

BY WALTER LAFEBER

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IN A DISCUSSION of Sino-Japanese relations with a Socialist member of the Japanese Diet in January, 1968, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai attacked Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato's government for building up Japanese security forces. Chou charged that such troops would soon be sent to Okinawa as well as elsewhere up and down the Pacific, and that this militarism would not only gravely endanger the peace of all Asia, but would also weaken the Japanese economy.

Three months before this interview, a Japanese foreign ministry spokesman privately offered a different blueprint of Sino-Japanese relations.

Potentially we Japanese have a great interest in Chinese affairs, since our histories and our cultures have close ties. But our daily life is not at all influenced by our present relations with China. Whether those relations are good or bad, they don't affect pachinko or baseball and so the Japanese generally are just not concerned.¹

The contrast in the two statements reveals a basic difference between Japan and China. With a population of 725 million, a per capita income of \$85, the after-effects of the Cultural Revolution, and the falling-away of former friends as close as Russia and as distant as Cuba, the Chinese feel increasingly influenced and surrounded by hostile forces. The Japanese, however, have most of their

pressing problems under control, at least for the present. Their 99 million people enjoy a per capita income of \$922, by far the highest in Asia. They are the industrial powerhouse in their part of the world, the third greatest economic power on the globe, exporters of intricate scientific instruments, machinery, iron and steel products, chemicals, photographic and transport equipment, and challengers of the United States itself in producing motor vehicles. Japan's shipbuilding is six times greater than that of her closest competitor, accounting for 40-50 per cent of the world's new tonnage annually.

Japan faces various opportunities to exploit and further develop this power. While Chinese Communist party leader Mao Tse-tung worries about new and old enemies, Sato worries about economic choices, all of which promise long-term wealth and security. Life was not always this pleasant for the Japanese, and it is important to note that they have found themselves in this situation only during the past five years. In the previous century, Japanese foreign policy was anchored in Manchuria, Korea (claimed by China until the present century) and Formosa. These were the vital security areas for army and industry alike. In 1914-1921, and again between 1937 and 1945, the Japanese attempted with blood and iron to control mainland China itself. Japan's refusal to bend to United States demands that China

¹ The correspondent was Charlotte Saikowski; she recounted the interview in the *Christian Science Monitor*, October 21, 1967, p. 4.

not be closed as a virtual Japanese economic sphere triggered the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

The American opportunity to reshape Japan through occupation in the post-1945 era (an operation from which Russia was excluded from the start), and the conquest of China by the Communists in 1949 transfigured the Asian scene.

Japan, as we saw it, was more important than China as a potential factor in world-political developments. [George Kennan recalls of the late 1940's period in the State Department] It was . . . the sole great potential military-industrial arsenal of the Far East.²

EARLY POSTWAR RELATIONS

Yet centuries of mutual attraction could not be dismissed by occupation forces or communism. Vowing in 1950 that geography and economics would prevail over "ideological differences and artificial trade barriers," Japanese Premier Shigeru Yoshida promised to send trade officials to Peking when United States General Douglas MacArthur gave permission. The Korean War halted this first step. Sino-Japanese relations were further retarded in 1951 when the United States maneuvered Japan into signing the peace treaty officially ending World War II with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan rather than with Mao. But the following year, a tentative trade agreement with mainland China was concluded, and this was renewed periodically until 1959.

With the end of the Korean conflict, Stalin's death, and the warmth generated from Peking under the "spirit of Bandung," cultural contacts were opened. At the end of the 1950's, A. Doak Barnett could write,

Japan has, in fact, been the most fertile field for the cultivation of Peking's "people's diplomacy." . . . By 1957 over 40 unofficial "agreements" had reportedly been signed between the Chinese Communists and various Japanese organizations or groups on trade, fisheries, and many other matters.³

² George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 374.

³ A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy* (New York: Vintage, 1960), p. 257.

As Barnett wrote, relations were souring. The turn in Chinese policy away from Bandung in 1957 coincided with a new Japanese cabinet formed by Nobusuke Kishi. When the new Premier moved closer to the United States and traveled on a successful good-will tour through Southeast Asia—where memories of Japan's World War II "Co-Prosperity Sphere" were still fresh—Peking attempted to slow up trade relations and interfere in Japanese elections. In 1959, a Chinese Communist flag was mutilated by a Nagasaki crowd. Trade was stopped. Still, China seemed to be gaining influence when, in 1960, Japanese riots prevented a visit by United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower and made passage of the United States-Japanese Security Pact extremely difficult.

In July, 1960, Hayato Ikeda became Premier, and Japan entered into a decade which so far has earned the label of the "Successful Sixties." Before dying of cancer in 1964, Ikeda played foreign political affairs in a very low key, concentrating instead on building a sound domestic economy and extending burgeoning Japanese economic strength throughout the Pacific area. Ikeda's Liberal Democratic party retained a 60 per cent majority in the November, 1963, elections, and the nation rose to become the sixth greatest economic power in the world. Within another four years Japan would pass France, the United Kingdom and West Germany to rank third behind the two superpowers.

Ikeda, however, did not forget Peking. In 1962, with Liao Cheng-chief representing China and Tatsunosuke Takasaki leading the Japanese delegation, a five-year trade agreement was reached under auspices best described from the Japanese side as semigovernmental. Tokyo continued to resist recognizing Mao's government officially, since such recognition would severely jeopardize extensive economic relations with Taiwan and with the United States. The semigovernmental L-T agreement (so-called after the initials of the two leading negotiators) envisioned a half-billion dollars worth of annual trade. This would be supplemented by exchanges between China and "friendly" Jap-

anese firms which were designated by China.

The L-T trade grew until 1966, when it declined to 34 per cent of total trade between the two nations. The following year it represented less than 30 per cent, but the "friendly firms" picked up much of the slack.

TRADE AND THE RED GUARDS

By late 1966, however, the Red Guards had demonstrated that Mao's fear of revisionism, not the tranquility necessary for economic development, had assumed first priority. The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution had little direct effect on 1966 trade figures; total exchange with Japan rose 32 per cent over 1965. Tokyo's exports climbed by more than 28 per cent and the Japanese enjoyed a favorable trade balance of \$8 million, but the Chinese also sold 37 per cent more goods to Japan than they had in 1965. China moved into fourth place among Japan's trading partners, passing both Taiwan and the Soviet Union, and this rise was abetted by the more than 4,000 Japanese tourists who visited the mainland.

China was taking a first important step in keeping apart her two great potential Asian opponents, Japan and Russia, a development not lost upon the Soviets. *Izvestia* (official government newspaper) complained in the early spring of 1967 that having once provided 50 per cent of China's trade, Russia now enjoyed only 6 per cent of it while 75 per cent went to the capitalists. "This," complained the Soviet organ, "is a curtsy to the imperialists."⁴

ANTIFOREIGNISM'S TOLL

The curtsying towards Japan, however, had already stopped. The chaos and anti-foreignism of the Cultural Revolution began taking a toll. Trade with Japan over the first six months of 1967 dropped 30 per cent under that of the comparable 1966 period (and that period had been 50 per cent higher than the first six months of 1965). Chinese purchases of heavy equipment fell rapidly, but nevertheless a critical gap between im-

ports and exports widened, thereby threatening China's weak financial reserves. The only major Japanese breakthrough was the sale of 200 Hino Ranger trucks, at \$3,000 per truck, for delivery in early autumn, 1967. This was the first time that Japan's manufacturers had been able to capitalize upon China's need for motor vehicles.

Otherwise the picture was grim. The L-T agreement would expire at the end of 1967, and Peking indicated little desire to renew it. Nor were "friendly firms" finding fairer fields. Some of their resident representatives learned in August that their visas would not be renewed; ten returned to Japan. The Teintsin Trade Fair was postponed, ostensibly because Tokyo refused to exhibit certain scientific machinery that the Chinese wanted to see. The great Canton Fair was postponed from October until mid-November. After some Japanese were mistreated and five were placed under house arrest, the number of Japanese businessmen in China dwindled to around 50 by late summer, 1967. The worst incident occurred on July 24, when Red Guards invaded the Peking *Hsin-chiao* Hotel to beat and arrest Japanese businessmen for "spying" on the Guards.

Such treatment was not limited to businessmen. Peking expelled three of the nine Japanese correspondents in the capital for supposedly criticizing Mao. When three others returned home upon the expiration of their duty, the Chinese refused to allow their replacements to enter the country. The Japanese Publishers Association, however, did not protest, maintaining a calm in contrast to its vigorous condemnation of the Red Guards some six to ten months before. When the Canton Fair finally opened, only \$130 million worth of contracts were signed, and even that total was misleading, for some \$70 million represented steel and steel products that were usually negotiated through L-T channels. It seemed that "friendly firms" trade would dissipate along with the L-T agreement.

Looking more closely at these changes, Japanese businessmen could conclude that they were even more disastrous than first glances indicated. The trade that did con-

⁴ The relevant figures can be found in a superb summary in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 28, 1967, pp. 626-629.

tinue in late 1967 seemed to flow mainly from overseas Chinese living in Japan. They were grouped together in the Tokyo Overseas Chinese Association of approximately 40 companies. Japanese businessmen complained they could not compete with the overseas Chinese because the latter were receiving special favors from Peking.

At the same time, another severe threat appeared from Western Europe. German and Italian trade with China jumped 83.9 per cent and 63.7 per cent respectively in 1967, moving into some former Japanese markets and forcing Japan's "friendly firms" to cut their prices sharply in order to compete. When the Japanese agreed in February, 1967, to provide 2.12 million tons of ammonium sulphate, an important chemical fertilizer, they sold 600 million tons more than the previous year; but they were compelled to cut their price 30 per cent because just three months earlier the Chinese had bought 3 million tons from the European consortium, NITREX, at a cut-rate price. The Japanese hoped that the European invasion would be short-lived; they ascribed its success to Europe's economic recession and believed that in the long run, China would prefer to deal with Japan—where many of the exchanges are made on a barter basis—than with Europeans, who demanded part of the Chinese monetary reserves.

CHANGING JAPANESE ATTITUDES

The events of 1967 made a dramatic impact upon Japanese attitudes. For the first time in the postwar world, the Chinese replaced the Soviets at the bottom of Japanese public opinion polls. The Japanese Communist party moved farther away from Peking. When the Socialists attempted to be friendlier with the Chinese, Japanese voters dealt that leading opposition party stunning losses in the January, 1967 elections.

In early 1968, both sides quite clearly confronted a reassessment of policy. The Chinese began to feel the economic setbacks

generated by the Cultural Revolution, shocks made even more severe by the British devaluation of sterling, the reserve currency used by China.⁵ Sato also had to take cognizance of the deteriorating relationship with China. In the 1967 elections, his Liberal-Democratic party received less than 50 per cent of the popular vote for the first time since the 1940's. Like other Japanese parties, the L.D.P. rallied around an individual leader rather than a set of party policies. The party leader ruled in turn by playing off factions through compromise and patronage. This pattern resulted in the lack of a long-term foreign policy but forced the Premier to react to any factions which seemed to be gaining strength.

Japan's troubles with China opened opportunities to three factions within the L.D.P. One was led by Yasuhiro Nakasone, a leading exponent of peaceful coexistence with China and an ambitious seeker of the premiership. In November of 1967, Sato attempted to appease this faction by naming Nakasone as Transport Minister. A second faction was the traditional pro-Peking group of approximately 30 *Diet* members. A third was the usual anti-Sato faction which seized upon the China issue to embarrass the Premier. This political pressure, combined with the discontent within parts of the business community, pushed Sato into making overtures to the Chinese for a renewal of the L-T agreement and for increased trade with the "friendly firms." After some initial coolness, the Chinese consented to open talks.

The sessions in Peking lasted from February 8 to March 6, 1968. From all indications, they were intense and bitter. Twice the bargaining stalled. The Chinese insisted that they must pay for imports by selling Japan about 100,000 more tons of rice than the latter wanted; the Japanese had enjoyed a good 1967 harvest and were buying large quantities of the staple from the United States and Formosa, two nations Tokyo did not want to trouble. The Chinese, however, carried their point.

Next they insisted that the Japanese delegation swallow the demand that three po-

⁵ In the spring of 1968, Peking switched to the franc—just before the riots erupted in Paris and threatened the franc's stability.

litical principles be included in the pact: Japan would not assume a hostile attitude toward China; would take no part in the "plot to form the two Chinas"; and would in no way obstruct better Sino-Japanese relations. The delegation from Tokyo finally accepted these principles also, arguing later that it represented a private group and that therefore the principles were not binding on the Sato government. Two *Diet* members of the Liberal-Democratic party nevertheless had participated in the negotiations, and the difference between private and governmental in this case was film-thin.

The Japanese Foreign Office felt it wise to announce officially that the three principles were not binding, that indeed they could not be binding because Tokyo had close relations with Taiwan. The Foreign Office spokesman carefully added that Japan, of course, was not hostile to China, and that trade between the two countries should be enlarged.

The final result was a one-year private agreement to replace the five-year L-T pact. Total trade would probably amount to approximately \$100,000,000, consisting primarily of chemical fertilizers and rice. The Japanese received a side benefit when a thousand of their businessmen traveled to the Canton Trade Fair in April, 1968, and signed approximately \$150 million worth of additional trade contracts.

Three weeks after the agreement had quieted the dissident factions within the L.D.P., Sato suddenly faced another challenge. President Lyndon B. Johnson's speech of March 31, 1968, indicated to many Japanese that the United States was preparing to pull out of Asia, leaving Japan to face China on her own. Having foresworn the development of nuclear weapons (an oath that must be devalued because Japan's development of peacetime uses of nuclear energy has been so successful that the Japanese could transform it into military power in a short time), the Japanese had counted on offsetting the Chinese nuclear bombs with the threat of United States counterforce. The apparent change in Johnson's posture put that defense into question. The L.D.P. dissidents warned

that Japan must work out a foreign policy independent of the United States. This warning was coupled with the observation that Sato's refusal to recognize Peking had been undercut by the three principles and by Japanese industrialists, many of whom were close to Sato's government and profited from extensive trade relations with mainland China.

The Premier again found himself in a difficult position. He had based his policies on friendship with Taiwan and close cooperation with the United States. A Sato-Johnson communiqué had called the Chinese Communists a "threat," and the Premier had used similar language when traveling through Asia. Such words had measurably contributed to the worsening Sino-Japanese economic relations in 1967.

Sato began to extricate himself by announcing in April that the "Yoshida letter" was not binding on his government. That letter, written by former Premier Shigeru Yoshida, had assured Chiang Kai-shek that Japan would not extend long-term governmental credits to the Peking government. Such credits were necessary if Sino-Japanese trade were to flourish, and Japanese businessmen had maneuvered around the restriction by extending private credits. After Sato's announcement, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki added that decisions on credit would be made with an open mind and on a case-by-case basis. Miki further indicated that he saw Japan acting as a "bridge" between the United States and Communist China after the conflict in Vietnam ended.

A CRITICAL PERIOD

The months following the spring of 1967, when Sino-Japanese trade began to deteriorate, have been a critical period. Described in this manner, however, the events are misleading as to the nature of Japan's relationship with China. Japan—not China—moved from strength in the negotiations, and Sato reacted to internal party pressures, not to any profound or crisis-laden developments in Japan's socio-economy. If Japan's economy floundered, the Sato regime would be in

severe difficulty. With the economy prosperous, the Premier could afford to placate the L.D.P. factions with his left hand while devoting his major attention to areas other than China. Not that Chinese trade is unimportant or that Peking's nuclear bomb does not pose political, military and psychological difficulties. But Sato and Japanese businessmen have so many projects afoot in so many parts of the world, that China—and particularly a chaotic China—becomes for the foreseeable future an opportunity for ambitious (and changing) *Diet* factions rather than a major option for the key Japanese decision-makers.

The important options are now found elsewhere, including ironically China's two major enemies, the Soviet Union and the United States. Opportunities are also present in Southeast Asia, an area which China has historically marked out as her own area for domination.

In 1967, Japanese trade with China amounted to \$560 million, down 10 per cent from 1966 and amounting to only 2.6 per cent of Japan's overall trade. Her exchanges with the Soviets, however, jumped 24 per cent to \$600 million, making Russia Japan's number one Communist trading partner. Of greater importance, however, are the beginnings of Russo-Japanese cooperation in developing the fabulous timber and mineral riches of Siberia. The Russians need developmental capital and technological know-how in that region. The Japanese, who import 99 per cent of their petroleum, 80 per cent of their copper, 90 per cent of their iron ore and 65 per cent of their coking coal, as well as vast quantities of timber and nearly all their raw textile materials, could use the Siberian wealth to ease their dependence upon Middle Eastern oil and American minerals. Much of the area to be developed is not distant from the Chinese border.

Peking's *People's Daily* commented upon the impending deal by calling the "Soviet ruling clique . . . a gang of national scums and traitors," and charging that Japan and Russia were working hand-in-glove with the Americans to encircle the People's Republic.

The Japanese-Soviet negotiations have many obstacles ahead, but the Japanese are now confronted with the opportunity for peaceful, long-term exploitation of the area, much to the disgust of the Chinese.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The number one "imperialist power," in China's view, is also Japan's number one partner in political and economic affairs. In 1966, Japan sent 36 per cent of her exports to the United States (as compared with 26 per cent in 1956). But the relationship goes considerably deeper. American short- and long-term funds allow Japanese bankers to handle trade deficits and short-run recessions. United States military expenditures in Korea during the early 1950's and again in Vietnam in the mid-1960's pulled Japan out of economic down-turns. Sheltered under the American nuclear umbrella, Tokyo has enjoyed a low rate of military spending and large incomes from the six major air bases, two naval installations, two dozen lesser facilities (i.e., radar sites, hospitals and firing ranges) and the 36,000 men the United States maintains in Japan.

All is not calm. Japanese-American trade meetings are marked by dire threats of retaliatory protectionism. United States control of Okinawa is a sore in the relationship. Above all, Sato is one of the few Japanese politicians willing to give any important degree of public support to the American war in Vietnam, and even the Premier cancelled President Lyndon Johnson's visit to Tokyo in late 1966 because of Japanese animosity. The economic tie, however, is central. As

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Noting that "The nature of relations between Communist states . . . cannot be measured with the yardsticks of Western political thinking," this Sinologist declares that "... we should not forget that changes in a Communist state can be effected quickly if the party leadership so decides." Nonetheless, "As long as Mao and his close followers . . . are still in power, relations between Peking and Moscow may get worse before they get better."

The Sino-Soviet Conflict Today

BY KURT L. LONDON

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SOME TWO YEARS ago in these pages,¹ in an ideological analysis of the Moscow-Peking quarrel, the quarrel was termed by this author unquestionably "one of the most important events of our era."²

Events since have strengthened this conviction, and the escalation of the war in Vietnam has become a particularly burning issue, laying bare the dilemma facing both Moscow and Peking.²

However, it would be a mistake to single out the war in Vietnam as the major obstacle to a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Communist China. It is just one of many factors that have contributed to an aggravation of relations between the two regimes.

Joseph Stalin's abortive attempts to impose his will on the Chinese Communist party (C.C.P.), for which he apparently had very little esteem, may have reawakened old grudges. But party discipline was such that Chinese Communists accepted a European interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, until Mao Tse-tung slowly and carefully Sinified the doctrine while continuing to make his obeisance to Stalin as the leader of world communism. This picture changed rapidly after the death of Stalin and even more after Stalin's denigration by his successor, Nikita

Khrushchev, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party (C.P.S.U.) in 1956.

Thus one could say that the first phase of the Russian-Chinese "separation" took place after 1953. The second phase, that of ideological polemics, which began in 1956, ended in early 1960, when the quarrel came into the open with the now famous article, "Long Live Leninism," in the Chinese Communist party journal *Hung Ch'i*. From 1960 to 1964, the war of words continued unabatedly; attempts by Khrushchev to call a world conference of Communist parties in order to denounce the Chinese heresy failed in 1964. In 1965, the attention of Peking and Moscow was preoccupied by such important international events as the bombing of North Vietnam, the Indian-Pakistani conflict, and the abortive Indonesian Communist coup. On September 2, 1965, Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao made his famous—or rather infamous—speech in which he offered a strategic blueprint of revolutionary militancy.

NEW PHASE BEGINS

In January, 1966, the Soviets directed an intensified radio campaign toward the central Asian frontier to reach the population of Sinkiang Province, which, with Tibet, is one of the politically most vulnerable areas of China. At the same time, rumors were disseminated by Moscow that China was hindering the transport of Soviet military equipment to North Vietnam. China promptly accused the Soviets of not having squashed

* I am greatly indebted to Anita M. Dasbach of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies for her contributions to this article.

¹ *Current History*, October, 1966, p. 244.

² See the author's "Vietnam: A Sino-Soviet Dilemma," *The Russian Review*, January, 1967, p. 26 ff.

such rumors, which could only worsen the relations between the two nations; the Soviets rejected China's demand that they disown these rumors. In February, the quarrel moved to a higher stage when China accused the Soviet Union of collaboration with the United States in a military encirclement of China. Whether or not Mao actually believed in the truth of this accusation, he used it, as Stalin had used the encirclement slogan, to deal all the more harshly with internal opposition and, on the other hand, to rally the population to an anti-foreign campaign.³

Just a few days earlier, Peking had published a map showing alleged United States attempts to encircle China. In this connection, it criticized Soviet leaders by name, attacking Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin for having provoked the Indian-Pakistani discord on Kashmir.⁴

Under these circumstances it is no surprise that the sixteenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance, signed in 1950 to run for 30 years, went by relatively unnoticed and uncelebrated. The depth of the discord became even clearer when on March 21, 1966, the German newspaper *Die Welt* made public a secret Soviet letter to Communist parties around the world accusing China of trying to provoke a Russo-American war.⁵ The letter, which had become known in early February, was in essence a Soviet statement of the case against China.

Peking responded by virulently assailing the Soviet leaders and their "anti-Chinese" circular and rejecting the Soviet invitation to the 23d Party Congress in March. The Kremlin's refusal further to increase its assistance to North Vietnam led to a particularly bitter Chinese blast against the Soviet Union on July 10. Chinese Vice Premier

Chen-yi went so far as to accuse the Soviets of being responsible for United States bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong because of their collaboration with the Americans and charged that the U.S.S.R. had had advance notice of the bombings.⁶

This was the beginning of a period in which the Red Chinese domestic scene, which since 1958 had been deeply disturbed by the "Big Leap Forward" and the establishment of the "People's Communes," was even further confused by the outbreak of the "Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution." This was a campaign by Mao and his followers to destroy local Communist party organizations because Mao feared that their vested interests would lead them eventually into "Soviet revisionism," i.e., a mellowing process ending the militant phase of the revolution and beginning a period of stabilization. For this reason, Mao mobilized the Red Guards, young Chinese stormtroopers.

As the Cultural Revolution released the masses for direct action internally, it apparently also impelled them to participate directly in foreign affairs. Both the United States and the Soviet Union came under heavy fire, and in August, 1966, unruly teenagers demonstrated in a street leading to the Soviet embassy, shouted anti-Soviet slogans and blocked the way of the Soviet chargé d'affaires. Less than two weeks later, despite vigorous Soviet protests against the initial demonstrations, the Red Guards announced plans for another three-day mass demonstration before the Soviet embassy. But this time Chinese troops guarded the embassy. The Red Guards demonstrated for 30 hours, carrying signs threatening to "skin and burn" every Soviet diplomat.

In September, Peking ousted Russian students and, in October, the Soviet Union retaliated—significant moves which severed the ties between the younger generations of Chinese and Soviet Communists. Toward the end of October, the Red Guards again demonstrated against the Soviet embassy in Peking, blocking cars, posting anti-Soviet slogans, and carrying on their activities for two

³ "New Face of China-Soviet Rift Centers on U.S. Encirclement," *The New York Times*, February 6, 1966, p. 1.

⁴ See *Jen Min Jih Pao*, February 2, 1966.

⁵ "The Russian-China Blast is Revealed," *The New York Times*, March 22, 1966, p. 1.

⁶ See *Peking Review*, No. 29 (July 15, 1966), 28-29; *Pravda*, July 15, 1966; *Izvestia*, July 16, 1966. Cf. also the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 18, No. 28 (August 3, 1966), 18-19.

days in protest against the Soviet expulsion of students. The end of 1966 saw now-familiar walk-outs from conferences; Chinese officials walked out of the Moscow observance of the forty-ninth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution and Russian diplomats walked out of the Peking rally marking the centenary of Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen's birth.

In late November, *Pravda* (Soviet Communist party newspaper) carried an editorial opening an all-out C.P.S.U. attack on the C.C.P. It denounced particularly the anti-Soviet character of the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard demonstrations against the U.S.S.R. embassy. It further charged that the Chinese leaders were brainwashing their people to believe that the Soviet Union was "Enemy No. 1."⁷

In 1967 direct Sino-Soviet confrontations continued. Chinese students returning to Moscow from West Europe were reported by official Soviet news agency *Tass* to have shouted anti-Soviet slogans and to have created disorder in the Kremlin and the Red Square near the Lenin Mausoleum.⁸ The Chinese claim that about 30 students were injured and that the clash had begun when they intoned the *Internationale*. Peking replied in *Jen Min Jih Pao* that the days of the "filthy Soviet revisionist swine" are numbered.⁹ Millions of Chinese rallied in organized protests throughout China. Furthermore, massive demonstrations again were held at the Soviet embassy in Peking. Soldiers were reported to be participating; slogans were plastered on cars, office doors and windows calling for "frying," hanging or burning Soviet leaders. Emergency evacuation measures for dependents of Soviet personnel in Peking were prepared and all Chinese employees of the embassy were fired.

In February, 1967, the Soviet Union warned China to halt her campaign of vio-

lence and humiliation against the Russians in Peking, or face retaliatory action. But several days later, Chinese demonstrators hindered the departure of Soviet citizens from Peking. Soviet diplomats became virtual prisoners in the embassy compound; meanwhile, in Moscow, students and workers penetrated into the Chinese embassy. In Peking some Soviet officials sought refuge in the walled compounds of European embassies while Chinese protesters hanged Soviet leaders in effigy. The U.S.S.R. again warned that it would take "necessary retaliatory measures" if China did not stop the rioting outside the U.S.S.R. embassy in Peking and permit the Soviet staff to move about freely.

Despite these confrontations, Premier Aleksei Kosygin said the Soviet Union would do everything possible to prevent a diplomatic break. This attitude was prevalent during the entire period of Sino-Soviet confrontations. After 18 days, the Chinese siege of the Soviet embassy in Peking was lifted.

In a *Pravda* editorial of February 16, 1967, the Soviets took advantage of the developing internal opposition to Mao and condemned his leadership. Deploring the growing international isolation of the Mao regime and stating that "Peking's adventurous course and its anti-Soviet position evoke mounting resentment in the world Communist movement and among honest people in all countries," *Pravda* concluded that "there is no question that Mao Tse-tung's group will not succeed forever in deceiving the Chinese people and the Chinese Communists."¹⁰ The Chinese responded in an article in *Jen Min Jih Pao* which, for the first time, told the Chinese people that the U.S.S.R. was backing Mao's opposition.¹¹

The summer of 1967 brought a new verbal battle between the opponents.¹² In addition, in early August, 1967, the Soviet ship *Svirsk* became the object of a "hooligan" invasion in the port of Dairen. Red Guards boarded the vessel, creating havoc and writing or pasting slogans and threats all over the ship insulting the Soviet state and people. The *Svirsk*, with the anti-Soviet inscriptions, was

⁷ *Pravda*, November 28, 1966.

⁸ *The New York Times*, January 26-February 4, 1967.

⁹ January 27, 1966.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, February 16, 1967, p. 3 (As translated in the *Current Digest*, Vol. XXIX, No. 7, pp. 6-9).

¹¹ February 16, 1967.

¹² *Izvestia*, July 4, 1967, pp. 2-3.

finally permitted to leave. Following this episode, which evoked bitter protest in the Soviet press, the Chinese again broke into the Soviet embassy, smashed furniture and windows and burned files and cars. Neither the police nor the troops made any move to prevent the disorders. The Soviets charged that this incident and the destruction in the embassy were aimed at goading the Kremlin into breaking diplomatic ties. But, as previously, the U.S.S.R. did not want to take upon itself the onus of being the first to make such a move. Indeed, Moscow invited Chinese representatives to attend its fiftieth anniversary celebration. Peking, however, refused.

In his opening address at the anniversary session, Brezhnev denounced both the United States and China. Partly in defense against Peking's accusation and partly as a result of his duty as the representative of a basically revolutionary government, he denied that the U.S.S.R. had abandoned the goal of world revolution and charged that it was China who harmed the cause.¹³

The balance sheet of 18 months of direct action against the citizens and diplomatic establishments both in Moscow and Peking reveals the primary instigators to be the Chinese, with the Soviets reacting in a relatively restrained fashion. Aggressive Chinese militancy was apparently greatly stimulated by the "Cultural Revolution" and by the comparatively cautious attitude of the Soviets in the Vietnamese War. Furthermore, the Chinese were frustrated as a result of severe defeats in foreign affairs and a growing isolation which exacerbated their aggressive stance. In addition, the increasingly confused conditions inside China, where various factions claiming to be Maoist fought each other, contributed to the lack of rational policies. While this period marked the lowest point of Sino-Soviet relations in the years following the public outbreak of the quarrel in 1960, neither Peking nor Moscow broke official relations with each other.

CONFERENCE IDEA RENEWED

In the 1966-1968 period, Soviet policy-makers continued to be confronted with the question of what action to take vis-à-vis the mounting hostility of the Chinese Communists without creating further division among Communist countries. They tried the old palliative—which had been used without much success—namely, calling a world conference to deal collectively with China.

In early 1966, the subject of a world conference was brought up again at several European congresses involving among others Bulgarian, Hungarian, French, Italian and East German party representatives. The response was mixed but generally unenthusiastic. There obviously was much hesitation to read out of the world Communist system a party as potentially powerful as the Chinese.

On April 24, 1967, a conference of European Communist parties opened at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. It was to be a major step toward convening a world conference. Of the 24 attending parties, only 15 supported such a conference. This constituted a major setback for Moscow's China policy. It became clear that the Kremlin could count on East European support of its China policy only so long as it did not further exacerbate the Sino-Soviet conflict and confined itself to the political isolation of China. But if Peking's isolation within the world Communist movement was acceptable, further Sino-Soviet confrontations were not. This, however, was an unrealistic position which the Soviet leaders were unwilling to accept. By the end of 1967, they had launched three attempts to convene a world Communist conference, while stating that it was not the purpose of the conference to "excommunicate" anyone.¹⁴

On November 27, 1967, it was announced that a consultative meeting would be held in Budapest in February, 1968. According to *Tass*, the February meeting was merely to set the stage for a later world conference. Moreover, Yugoslavia refused to participate and so did Cuba. The Japanese party likewise refused as did the Swedish and Dutch

¹³ *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, November 4, 1967.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, November 25, 1967.

parties. Rumania, although basically opposed to the conference, left her decision open because of improved economic ties with the Soviet Union. China and Albania returned the invitations.

The consultative conference began on February 29, 1968, in Budapest. Sixty-seven Communist parties were represented when it opened; 81 could have attended. Rumania walked out when the U.S.S.R. tried to ram through plans for a world conference. The Hungarian delegate criticized the Chinese, Rumanian, and Soviet parties, but a later Hungarian press report dropped the reference to the C.P.S.U. The final communiqué called for a world conference in Moscow toward the end of 1968. The consultative meeting was not an event the Soviets could be proud of; it revealed considerable weakness and lack of leadership within the Communist camp.

In April, a commission assembled in Budapest to organize the world Communist conference. Thirty-four of the Communist parties were not represented at this April 24–28 meeting. Nevertheless, it was decided to set the date of the convention for November 25, 1968.

At this writing, it seems that all the parties which attended the February Budapest conference (except the Rumanian) will attend the November gathering.

As the attention of the Communist and non-Communist world is turned to this year-end conference, the Soviet theoretical journal *Kommunist* has published a number of articles justifying the Soviet position.¹⁵ Basic to Soviet condemnation of China may be the claim that Chinese Communists are not socialists and are not even moving on the path toward socialism. General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. Brezhnev said in March, 1967: "What has been happening in China

recently looks . . . like a reactionary military coup with Mao and the army overthrowing communism. . . ."¹⁶ And a few months later, *Pravda* stated that: "If the Mao group manages to continue in power, the possibility of a big historic zigzag in the development of Chinese society cannot be ruled out."¹⁷

In the meantime, the conflict rages on. Involved are not only the question of differing Soviet and Chinese doctrinal interpretations and a struggle for leadership in world communism, but also such problems as the war in Vietnam. The U.S.S.R.'s interest in that area is based not only on its investment in the Communist rule of the North Vietnamese Ho Chi-minh regime and its refusal to let any established Communist regime founder, but also on the fact that the U.S.S.R., with its vast central Asian territories, considers itself not only a European but also an Asian power. It is the latter claim that the Chinese contest.¹⁸

While Moscow is unquestionably loath to accept the American presence in Asia, it also fears that China will dominate Asia.

Although a united Vietnam under Communist leadership would seem to be theoretically desirable from the Soviet point of view, an ominous background presence of Red China would almost suggest in practice that a divided Vietnam may not [thwart] the long-range policy planners of the USSR.¹⁹

Similarly, Peking—which has accused Moscow of collusion with the United States—would object to the establishment of a Soviet presence in North Vietnam, not only because such a presence would impair China's influence, but also because the Mao regime fears Soviet "modern revisionism" as detrimental to the Chinese Cultural Revolution. So far North Vietnam has continued to sit on the fence, not wanting to risk her good standing with either Peking or Moscow: Soviet armaments, which cover at least 80 per cent of the North Vietnamese needs, apparently are given without strings attached, but whether any secret arrangements have been made by which the price for the arms is to be North Vietnam's support for Moscow's position is not known. The aid pact signed

¹⁵ "The Roots of the Present Events in China," *Kommunist*, April 13, 1968, pp. 102–113.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, March 10, 1967.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, August 16, 1967.

¹⁸ See the author's "Vietnam: A Sino-Soviet Dilemma," *The Russian Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (January, 1967), 26 ff.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

by Moscow and Hanoi on October 4, 1966, reveals no such conditions.

For some time, the Soviets have accepted the political realities of the war in Vietnam. They surely realize that despite occasional setbacks or domestic disagreements with the Vietnam policy of the United States, an American military defeat is out of the question. Contrary to the Chinese, who have time and again encouraged the Vietnamese to fight on to the bitter end, the Soviets did not oppose the Paris negotiations in the summer of 1968 and most likely realize that no new United States President can afford to pull out of Vietnam entirely in spite of all the campaign oratory. Moscow must be as aware as Washington that an admitted American military defeat in Vietnam could have untold consequences not only in Asia but throughout the world—consequences which would benefit China more than the Soviet Union. It is therefore likely that, no matter what the outcome of the Paris negotiations, Vietnam will remain a strong bone of contention between Moscow and Peking, certainly while Mao or Maoists are in power.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the middle of 1965, the Sino-Soviet conflict has escalated considerably; and actual physical acts of hostility supplementing the war of words have occurred during the past two years. This situation coincides with China's internal upheaval; presumably without the Cultural Revolution any or most of the aggressive actions of the Chinese against the Soviets might not have taken place.

Whether the Soviet call for a world conference can be regarded as a purely retaliatory action is open to question. The desire for such a conference preceded the Cultural Revolution, but the Red Guards probably contributed to the speed-up of the Soviet timetable. Even should such a conference take place, participation by most of the Communist parties and unified action against China remain in grave doubt. As polycentrism already has created widespread diversification of communism, many of these parties

would be afraid that the total isolation of China from the Communist camp would recreate the dominant position of the Soviet party. That is unacceptable to most parties. Perhaps, consciously or not, the party officials feel that a continuation of the conflict compels the continuation of the Soviet party's permissiveness and prevents the reestablishment of the monolith.

Looking back at the troubled relations between the two Communist giants, it may be well to pause briefly for an objective appraisal of the current status of the quarrel and a projection into the future.

There is no doubt that the conflict has been exacerbated by acts of physical violence on both sides. There is also no doubt that neither opponent appears willing to take on the onus of being the first to sever relations, thereby deepening the split in the Communist camp. There has been considerable hostility on both sides. Peking has likened the Soviet Union to its greatest enemy, the United States, and Moscow has accused Peking of forsaking Marxism-Leninism, thereby widening the gap between Red China and the other socialist countries.

Under ordinary conditions, one should assume that such a deep schism is unbridgeable and that the cold war between Moscow and Peking will continue. A few observers even claim that such a situation can only lead to hot war between Russia and China. This proposition is as dubious as is the assumption that the conflict indicates an irretrievable break.

The nature of relations between Communist states—and for that matter relations between Communist and non-Communist countries—cannot be measured with the yardsticks of Western political thinking. The

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The relationships between China and her Southeast Asian neighbors are discussed by this author, who points out that "the term 'great power' must be applied to the foreign policy goals of China. . . . China's behavior can be understood not only as the product of reactions to the real or imagined provocations of others, but as the product of relatively concrete great power ambition and goals—goals which would exist even without these provocations."

The Southeast Asian View of China

BY BERNARD K. GORDON

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IRONICALLY, Americans appear to argue more about the role of Mainland China in Asia than Asians do themselves. For in Asia, especially among those leaders responsible for shaping the foreign and defense policies of the Southeast Asian nations, there is a growing consensus. It holds that China must be counted as among the "great powers" with specific interests in Southeast Asia. This view existed before China's detonation of a nuclear device, but her growing nuclear capacity has done nothing to destroy the image.

This is not to say that perceptions of China's present military power are exaggerated, for there is also widespread awareness in Southeast Asia that the so-called "cultural revolution" has not quickened China's military and industrial progress. Indeed, it is precisely this combination of factors that makes China especially relevant to Southeast Asians today. For China lacks truly great strength of the global sort that can be deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union; at the same time she is perceived as a great power, albeit one just emerging from more than a century of decline. As China begins to act again on the East Asian scene after a long period of weakness, it is hard to avoid the conclusion

that Southeast Asia will be of particular importance to her.

Consider, for example, the traditional areas of interest to China. In her North and Northwest, China must now reckon with the powerful and no longer friendly presence of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the enormous dynamism, prosperity and potential strength of Japan seem to make pointless any Chinese attempts to exercise effective influence on that Eastern flank. Southeast Asia, on the other hand, represents a relative power vacuum compared to other areas of traditional interest to China. Moreover—and still in comparison to other regions—Southeast Asia is nearly ideal for the application of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's modern revolutionary doctrines. As a region still overwhelmingly characterized by an often poverty-ridden rural population (though the proportion of peasants to town-dwellers is not so high as in the first postwar years), Southeast Asia holds the promise of greater gains with a lower level of risk and effort—for example by aiding local insurgents—than is involved in other regions adjacent to China.¹

Finally, of course, it is in Southeast Asia that the power and policies of the United States—China's self-proclaimed major adversary—are seen as most provocative and call (from Peking's perspective) for neutralization with most immediacy. For all these reasons,

¹ For discussion on this point see Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 121, and R. G. Boyd, *Communist China's Foreign Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 53.

Southeast Asian leaders have come increasingly to understand that their region holds special interest to Mainland China. Moreover, those who see China in power-political terms believe that this special interest also implies that Peking will seek to exercise some influence over their affairs.

Yet not all observers regard this as China's intention, despite the extremist terminology with which the *Peking Review*, for example, expresses China's foreign policies, and despite China's recent behavior. Some American analysts regularly argue that China's policy is essentially defensive and the product of reactions to others' provocations—to the United States in particular. In this view, China is seen as willing to live at peace with any Southeast Asian nation that does not associate itself closely with the United States.² Henry Steele Commager, a dean of American historians, has asserted flatly that "Chinese expansion is pretty much a figment of our imagination."³

Southeast Asian leaders, on the other hand, are aware that some among them—in Burma and Cambodia, for example—have tried very hard to avoid provoking China. Under General Ne Win, Burma has steered a neutral course which has led her to reject much potential Western assistance, and Cambodia has gone so far as to break relations with the United States. Yet since mid-1967, Burma has found that Ne Win is branded as a traitor, and Peking now regularly calls for "all the Burmese people to rise up to strive for the complete overthrow of the Ne Win military government and the establishment of a people's democratic and united front government. . . ."⁴

In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk has often referred to China as Cambodia's "best friend," and has argued that the war in Vietnam is a civil war in which there should be no Ameri-

can intervention. Yet in 1967–1968, in the wake of increasing insurgency in several Cambodian provinces, Sihanouk several times publicly warned against the activities of the "Khmer [Cambodian] Reds," and most recently he acknowledged that insurgents in Laos and Thailand act on the orders of North Vietnam and China. In May, 1968, for example, he announced that:

The Pathet Lao's dependence on Hanoi is known to everybody, including Souvanna Phouma. Everybody knows that the Viet Minh are behind the Pathet Lao. The Viet Minh have already swallowed Laos and are now contemplating pushing the Pathet Lao ahead to devour Cambodia. You will realize this more clearly when I come to the third category [of Cambodia's enemies]. *The Thai Patriotic Front was born in Peking; it depends on Peking.* Peking recognizes our frontiers but the Front does not. You can see that there is not much of a guarantee from the communist side.⁵

Unlike Ne Win, Prince Sihanouk has not yet had to face China's open call for his overthrow, but his remarks suggest that he at least will not be too surprised if that developed sometime soon.

The government of Malaysia, though certainly not so neutral as that of General Ne Win or Prince Sihanouk, is at the same time not so openly "pro-Western" as some others in Southeast Asia. Malaysia does not, for example, have any formal connections with the United States; it has not received any American aid; and even before Britain announced its intention to withdraw in 1971 from Singapore and Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur was becoming increasingly independent of London. Nevertheless, China has fostered a "Malayan National Liberation League" based in Peking, and through this medium has demanded the overthrow of Malaysia's Prime Minister, Tunku [Prince] Abdul Rahman. "All genuine Malayan patriots," the League said last year, must step up "their struggle against US-backed British imperialism and the Malayan puppets, in order to crush 'Malaysia.'"⁶

Southeast Asian leaders, who might be prepared to rationalize or to defend such attacks when directed against the more clearly American-associated governments in Thailand and

² For an expression of this view as recently as early 1967, see David Mazingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," *World Politics*, April, 1967, pp. 361–77.

³ In *The New York Times Book Review*, July 16, 1967, p. 23.

⁴ *New China News Agency*, July 1, 1967.

⁵ From Prince Sihanouk's press conference in Phnom Penh, May 23, 1968. Emphasis added.

⁶ *New China News Agency*, May 14, 1967.

the Philippines, are much less willing to explain away Peking's vilification of the governments in Burma, Cambodia or Malaysia. And since late 1965, in the wake of the attempted *coup* in Indonesia, it has been even more difficult to ascribe any but the worst intentions to China's leadership and to those domestic groups in Southeast Asian nations who are endorsed by Peking.

In the Indonesian case, there is not yet sufficient evidence available to "prove" that China was intimately involved in the abortive *coup* that led to the destruction of Indonesia's Communist party (and the murder of several hundred thousand Indonesians), but there is considerable circumstantial evidence. This points to Chinese complicity in an attempt either to overthrow President Sukarno or make of him no more than a figurehead—and it must be remembered that of all Southeast Asian leaders Sukarno had been the most active in forging warm and close ties with China. Sukarno even boasted that he had helped create a Djakarta-Hanoi-Peking "axis." Yet it seems likely that China helped those Indonesian Communists who concluded that they could wait no longer to seize power.⁷

For its part, China does not of course admit complicity, but it has to be noted that a "new" China-blessed Indonesian Communist party (operating from Peking) has explained the failure of the *coup* in a formal statement. This document complains that those responsible for the *coup* did not prepare well enough; the statement, which must be re-

garded as a reflection of Peking's view, does not deny that the purpose of the Indonesian Communists was to bring about a Communist regime in Indonesia.⁸ It argues only that Mao's principles were not followed by the former Communist party in Indonesia.

These considerations suggest that if Peking does indeed seek friendly relations with governments in Southeast Asia, and reacts with hostility only to those who provoke her, then Peking perceives provocations few can recognize. It also seems clear that the only regimes "acceptable" to China are those willing to accept major Chinese influence in their affairs, or at minimum those in which China-affiliated local Communists have a major share in the running of government. This may be simply another way of saying that China, emerging now from her decline, is beginning to behave in ways consistent with the traditional behavior of great powers, and for this reason will aim for predominant influence on her rimland.

Yet some analysts, when they deny the need for a continuing United States involvement in Asia, disagree with this premise. A prominent Australian scholar has remarked that those who deny the need for countervailing power around China reflect "an exceedingly optimistic view of the way Chinese power is likely to be used . . . [and] an assumption that China is somehow a Power unlike all other Powers, neither needing to be checked by countervailing power nor susceptible of so being." The unreality of this proposition, she has concluded, "is apparent as soon as it made explicit":

To argue in 1966 that China could never be expected to acquiesce in a rival power structure in South Asia is precisely equivalent to arguing in 1946-1947 that Russia could never be expected to tolerate a rival power structure in Western Europe. Such a situation was possible and Russia did in fact come to accept it, and twenty years after the process began . . . the prospects for peace look a good deal better than when it was initiated. To assume that China must be conceded unchecked hegemony in South Asia is to acquiesce in so substantial an addition to her future power-base (taking into account manpower and resources and nuclear weapons) that it is difficult to see the consequent world

⁷ While the events leading up to the attempted *coup* are still much debated, a number of scholars point to reports of secret arms shipments from China to Indonesia in the week just before the event. See, for example, Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," *The China Quarterly*, January-March, 1966, p. 168, and J. V. Van der Kroef, "GESTAPU in Indonesia," *ORBIS*, Summer, 1966, p. 467, where he cites reports in the *Sabah Times* of September 14, 1965. The belief, substantiated by these reports, is that China supplied arms disguised as building supplies, in a conspiracy approved by Subandrio which allowed arms to enter Indonesia without customs inspection. Some specialists find it difficult to believe that China engaged in this activity. The Indonesian government, and many Indonesians, however, are persuaded that China was involved.

⁸ The statement, a remarkable piece of self-criticism, appeared in dispatches of the *New China News Agency*, July 8, 1967.

finding a way to live quietly or to keep its crises manageable. There is of course no *present* similarity between the situation of South Asia and that of Western Europe. That is why the intervention of the outside Powers over a long transition period (perhaps twenty years) is likely to remain necessary.⁹

In broad terms, this is the view increasingly held by the political leadership and much of the intellectual leadership in most Southeast Asian states today. There are articulate spokesmen for the view that China poses no major security threat to Southeast Asia. But this is not a view held by the leadership in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand or Singapore. It is not even the view held by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, who stated in the fall of 1967 that "China does not swallow Cambodia because of the Americans."¹⁰ A few weeks later, the Prince made the point even more sharply: he told newsmen that if China caused unrest in Cambodia, and if there should not be enough arms and ammunition to cope with a rebellion, "I would have to retire and hand over to the Army, which would be obliged to turn to the Americans."¹¹ These are not new-found convictions for Sihanouk; earlier, in 1965, he wrote that "after the disappearance of the United States from our region and the victory of the Communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene."¹²

Southeast Asian leaders find less difficulty in reaching this conclusion than Americans,

whose perception of China has for years been complicated by a number of myths and contradictions. There is in Southeast Asia, for example, no real equivalent to the China Lobby that existed in the United States, and little parallel to the imagery and literature about China's travail that sparked the sympathy of millions of Americans before World War II. Instead, to politically-aware Southeast Asians, China represents three important elements; and only one of those has given rise to a sympathetic and friendly view of China.

THE THREE MEANINGS OF "CHINA"

First of all, in the Southeast Asian view, China is the traditional and alien great power of the region, with a long history of strong influence. Considering the fact that China represents one of the few truly great and cohesive world cultures, it is not surprising that her presence has long overawed the more primitive peoples of Southeast Asia. When Southeast Asians achieved a higher degree of culture, as they did in Vietnam, their culture was very much the product of Chinese influence. But being deeply influenced and even shaped by Chinese culture and behavior norms has not endeared China to the peoples on her rim, as the history of Japanese and Vietnamese relations with China helps demonstrate.

Second, in modern Southeast Asia, the normal anxieties which a small state might feel towards the giant of its region are intensified by the role of the *Nanyang* (overseas) Chinese populations. Throughout Southeast Asia the *Nanyang* Chinese exercise a position of economic dominance that is widely resented, feared and distrusted. The movement of Chinese to Southeast Asia is relatively recent; it was much accelerated by the economic and administrative policies of the colonial regimes of the past few centuries. Yet despite their recent arrival, the Chinese have nonetheless been the dominant ethnic group in economic and sometimes political matters in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and, in some important respects, in Indonesia and the Philippines.

There are qualifications, to be sure: in

⁹ Coral Bell, "Towards a Stable Asia," in *The World Today*, April, 1966, and reprinted in *Survival*, June, 1966, p. 190.

¹⁰ From press conference remarks in Phnom Penh on September 18, 1967, reported by Radio Cambodia, September 18, 1967, and reprinted in the *Christian Science Monitor*, October 16, 1967.

¹¹ Recently, in the face of continued insurgency in four provinces, Prince Sihanouk warned that if Cambodian Reds "go on creating insecurity... it will be necessary to... hand over power to the military authorities, which would be led by Lon Nol [Defense Minister], who will be like Suharto in Indonesia. . . . It will be up to him to decide whether we should accept US aid again" (Sihanouk speech of February 28, 1968, reported by *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*).

¹² From the Prince's letter to *The New York Times*, June 4, 1965. For a brief analysis of Cambodian foreign policy see Bernard K. Gordon, "Cambodia: Where Foreign Policy Counts," *Asian Survey*, September, 1965, pp. 433-448.

Cambodia, the *Nanyang* have shared pre-eminence with Vietnamese;¹³ in Thailand they have achieved a degree of assimilation which has smoothed the roughest edges of anti-Chinese sentiment; and in the Philippines the Chinese have not occupied the role of influence typical elsewhere in the region. But these qualifications do not detract from the intensity of a basic racism, aimed at local Chinese, which is one of Southeast Asia's most distinguishing characteristics. In the years since independence it has resulted in numerous instances of abuse and intimidation, and where free rein has been given (as in Indonesia) murder has not been uncommon. The presence of this strong ethnic resentment means that there are "two Chinas" in the minds of many Southeast Asians: "China," the great and perhaps fearsome nation, and "China," the source of the despised and dominating alien group at home. The two mental images are probably mutually reinforcing.

It is only modern "political" China that sometimes has been viewed sympathetically among some groups in Southeast Asia. There has been much admiration, and not only in the overseas Chinese communities, for modern China's accomplishments. This dates back to the *Kuomintang* period, and to the fact that even under Chiang Kai-shek

China was able to assert her independence and her identity, especially against the West. When the Communists came to power after 1949, and capped Chiang's limited achievements with the establishment of an effective central government, it was inevitable that many millions in Southeast Asia would be moved and encouraged by Mao's successes. In part, this is because they could be understood not only as China's successes but as Asia's success against the West. To Southeast Asian elites who had smarted under generally oppressive colonial restrictions, the banners that Mao carried were vastly appealing: the banners of anti-Westernism, anti-colonialism and the welfare of the masses.

This aspect of China's image in Southeast Asia eyes—the only favorable aspect—might have outweighed the two negative elements, and for a very brief period it did so. From 1954 to 1958–1959, China emphasized an Asian policy of friendship and reasonableness, symbolized by Premier Chou En-lai's masterful performance in Bandung in 1955. But by 1959, something approaching a "hard-line" was reinstated, and the 1960's have seen China dissipate much of the favorable capital that she had accumulated in Southeast Asia. Her strained relations with India, Indonesia and Burma (to say nothing of Peking's regular vilification of the Thai, Malaysian and Filipino governments) led many leaders in Southeast Asia to reexamine their perception of China. Many would have preferred *not* to see China in negative terms; they hoped that Peking would accept a "live and let live" approach. But China's behavior has made that view difficult to sustain, and this has been one of the prime elements leading Asians increasingly to think of ways to provide for their long-term security. It is in this perspective that the already-familiar concept of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has begun to take on new meaning.

China's increasing unfriendliness has provided something the "environment" for Asian regionalism has long lacked: a common perception of threat. This is a development of very large proportions, as both Soviet analysts and more impartial observers have noted.¹⁴

¹³ In Phnom Penh, Cambodia's capital, ethnic Cambodians (Khmers) are actually in a minority: Chinese and Vietnamese dominate the life of that city. In the economic life of Burma, a similar pattern existed for decades, but on a lower scale and with different players. In that case, colonial policy resulted in the dominance in Burmese life of alien Indians, as well as Chinese. Burma has for some years been embarked on a policy of evicting Indian businessmen, bankers and shopkeepers, but the anti-Chinese activities in Rangoon in mid-1967 would indicate that this policy had not yet caught up with the local Chinese population.

¹⁴ A leading Russian commentator (Matveyev) wrote in *Izvestia* that "fear of China helped the United States draw Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore more deeply into the American orbit" (*The New York Times*, August 31, 1967). With more objectivity, the respected *Far Eastern Economic Review* wrote the same week that "the excesses of the Cultural Revolution have brought a new unity to the rest of Asia. The five nations in ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] . . . have come together partly as a result of what they conceive to be the menace from China" (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 24, 1967, p. 359).

It has in the first instance lent new urgency towards economic regionalism in Southeast Asia, and most recently a number of leaders in the region have begun to discuss forms of defense collaboration as well. Leaders who would have been unwilling to name China as a potential threat to their security a few years ago are no longer so hesitant; as a result they are anxious to strengthen the whole region of Southeast Asia. Mochtar Lubis, one of Indonesia's most prominent journalists and writers, is typical. In late 1967, he remarked that although China was presently coping with internal difficulties, and for that reason was probably not an immediate threat, nonetheless he "personally favoured a military co-operation between the Southeast Asian nations."¹⁵

Similar comments have come from many other Asian leaders, including the Presidents of the Philippines and Indonesia, and the Prime Minister of Malaysia. In 1968, each suggested that the new patterns of economic cooperation they are now seeking to create might also lead to some form of military co-operation in Southeast Asia. The overriding explanation for this change in attitude is the recognition that the term "great power" must be applied to the foreign policy goals of China. Once that is done, China's behavior can be understood not only as the product of

reactions to the real or imagined provocations of others, but as the product of relatively concrete great power ambitions and goals—goals which would exist even without these provocations.

For this reason, even those analysts of Chinese policy who in the past preferred to portray China's policy as essentially defensive have begun to revise their estimates. One scholar, who in 1967 argued that China had adopted an unfriendly posture to certain Asian states (for example Thailand) only in reaction to the close military ties of those nations with the United States, concluded a year later that China's "basic objective" is a "belt of weak, friendly, pliant states which refrain from taking actions contrary to Peking's important interests."¹⁶

There is much difference between those two estimates, and even the second one is not reassuring to most Southeast Asian leaders. They cannot willingly accept the view that they must remain weak, or that Peking should essentially exercise a veto over their foreign policies. Instead, as the Malaysian Prime Minister has concluded, China must be considered among "our dangerous enemies." His view is now widely endorsed in Southeast Asia, as is his judgment that "if People's China would change its aggressive and hostile attitude aimed at dominating other countries, it might be possible that Malaysia could maintain friendly relations with Peking."¹⁷

For the time being, at least, Mainland China has shown little evidence of changing its "aggressive and hostile attitude," and in large part the response of the Malaysians and others in Southeast Asia is to try to forge a degree of unity in their region. This trend to some form of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia¹⁸ is perhaps the only encouraging

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¹⁵ Reported in ANTARA (Indonesia Press Agency), September 4, 1967.

¹⁶ David P. Mozingo, "Communist China: Its Southern Border Lands," *SAS Review* (Winter, 1968, Vol. 12, No. 2), p. 45. There is doubt, moreover, of the accuracy of Mozingo's earlier judgment that China's hostility to Thailand was provoked by Thai willingness to allow the United States to use Thai territory in support of Vietnam war actions. In 1959, China charged Thailand with becoming "the most active accomplice of the US imperialists . . . if they . . . persist . . . history will eventually bring them before the bar of justice" (*Peking Review*, June 2, 1959, Vol. II, No. 25, p. 23). This was long before there were American troops based in Thailand, and years before the Vietnamese War began in earnest.

¹⁷ ANTARA despatch from Kuala Lumpur, February 12, 1968.

¹⁸ I have dealt with these trends in an earlier article in *Current History* ("Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia," February, 1965), and in *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), Chapters 5-7. Also, in a just-completed book, I discuss in detail the relationship between American foreign policy and the development of Asian regionalism.

Bernard K. Gordon is a frequent contributor to periodicals. His most recent book is *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). He recently testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.

BOOK REVIEWS

On China

BY RENÉ PERITZ

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ENEMIES AND FRIENDS: THE UNITED FRONT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY. BY LYMAN P. VAN SLYKE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. 330 pages and index, \$8.50.)

Informal Chinese Communist party policy has at least three times in this century involved an alliance with major political rivals for the purpose of achieving a specific common objective. The broad Kuo-mintang-Communist alliance of the 1920's, the uneasy partnership of these same two groups in the late 1930's against the Japanese, the Party's effort to transform Chinese society in the 1950's are prime examples of an effective strategy designed to reduce social tensions in times of severe domestic crisis. The united front very rarely sought to achieve specific objectives but rather was meant to function for the avowed purpose of solving a series or variety of broadly structured problems. The united front in China, more so than in Europe, has been characterized by a specific frame of mind towards "domestic" and "international" issues. Thus the alliance arrangement, *per se*, very often is as important in its symbolic aspect as in its organizational form. For the Communist front serves to push forward the revolutionary process and, as the author takes pains to point out, is more important as a metaphorical device than as an operational principle. The author concludes that the united front in modern Chinese history must come to grips with a problem of basic relationships: how to associate the party elite with the representatives of the masses that do not belong to it.

CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA. BY A. DOAK BARNETT. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 563 pages and index, \$12.00.)

This is a superbly researched work describing the operative political system in Communist China, where a "mass line" has led the party to rely on large numbers of recruits drawn from many parts of the society to carry out campaigns to achieve specific national objectives. In modern Western countries these manifold objectives are achieved by routinized administrative methods. Professor Barnett discusses in great detail the complex functions of ideological fervor and the suitability of propaganda to underpin the present political system. The role of mass persuasion, either "coercive" or "free," highlights the techniques employed by the government and the party to achieve popular support for specific policies.

This is a book for the specialist who is interested not only in the ideological content of specific programs but also in matters of political planning, fiscal affairs, and general administration of bureau-level units.

THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE POLITICS. BY LUCIAN PYE. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1968. 255 pages, index, \$8.95.)

No doubt Chinese politics are complicated and Dr. Pye, in a sparkling, wide-ranging series of essays, investigates "the" Chinese personality in terms of a broad spectrum of psychological forces impinging

upon individuals in their total social environment. Dr. Pye once before has studied personality systems, at that time in Burma, and thus his more recent work on China continues his discussion of modal Asian psyches and drives. Interweaving broad problems of modernization, traditional Chinese views on multiple issues and contemporary psychiatric techniques of analysis he examines the assumptions guiding the Chinese as a people. His discussions are often didactic and impressionistic.

The book is a rationale for numerous methodological approaches designed to show that the Chinese have their own special models for understanding the world around them and their place in it.

DOLLARS, DEPENDENTS AND DOGMA.

By CHUN-HSI WU. Introduction by C. F. Remer. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, California, 1967. 237 pages, index, notes, and appendices, \$7.00.)

This is a very interesting book which deals with the important question of overseas Chinese remittances to Communist China. Securing foreign exchange has been a crucial and difficult matter for China and since that country's need for capital is almost limitless Chinese governments have tended to encourage an inward flow of funds from all parts of the world. Though the total sums involved, primarily secured through Hong Kong, are not especially high, it is clear that the task of economic development in China is made easier by overseas Chinese good will. In the last few years, however, funds available to mainland China have shrunk—as a result of the cultural revolution and the efforts of many Southeast Asian nations to assimilate their Chinese minorities. As the many overseas communities are absorbed into the host states, and as the various Chinese become naturalized, the capacity if not the desire of these communities to remit funds to their ancestral homes in China is being reduced.

FRIENDS, GUESTS, COLLEAGUES. By KENNETH E. FOLSOM. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968. 234 pages, index, bibliography and glossary, \$5.50.)

The Chinese Mu-Fu system traditionally represented a peculiar indigenous institution of privately hired advisers who constituted an informal "brain trust" in China. Members of the Mu-Fu were considered experts or professionals in government and operated outside of the generally accepted Confucian hierarchy of the scholar class. The Mu-Fu system which was most extensively used during the Manchu period (1644–1912) was highly personal and provincial and rarely identified with the policies of the national government. Mr. Folsom is quite successful in evaluating this particular world of Chinese personal relationships by discussing the operation of this institution at a time when China was seeking to modernize itself.

THE RED GUARD: A REPORT ON MAO'S REVOLUTION. By HANS GRANQVIST, translated by Erik J. Friis. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. 159 pages, \$5.95.)

The Chinese have called their recent upheaval the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"—a phrase that suggests a total social struggle within the operative confines of a regimented mass democracy and a socialist economy. It is in these areas that the revolution which was started in 1966 has become widely publicized. Basically, an important group within the People's Republic of China, never identified nor clearly described by Mr. Granqvist, is trying to transform age-old institutions into a new Chinese Communist system. Whether or not the new society which Mao Tse-tung and his associates wish for their country can come into existence is not the subject of this treatise. Rather, the author observes recent pronouncements and developments and comments in detail about Chinese flexibility in carrying out domestic programs.

PATTERN OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

(Continued from page 134)

Mao's "cultural revolution" is in part, as its name implies, an effort to promote rapidly (by distinctively Maoist techniques) the changes in social attitude which must be the precursors of sustained social and economic change. It also represents Mao's effort to insure that China's leaders remain committed to his goals and his techniques of leadership.

RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

The outcome of the present crisis in Communist China is hardly within the realm of predictable human events. Americans, along with people the world over, watch with a mixture of anxiety and fascination this incredible struggle convulsing the world's largest political entity. Never before have Americans, who once considered themselves to have a special relationship to the Chinese people, felt more threatened by or more isolated from this quarter of mankind. The radical change in Sino-American relations after 1949 from one of friendship to one of deep enmity has been a particularly bitter and ironic blow to those Americans who once sought very personal and direct ways to help the Chinese enter the modern world. Let me suggest in conclusion, however, that the United States continues to play a peculiar and surprisingly direct role in China's efforts to become a modern nation.

The intense hostility which certain Chinese Communist leaders have displayed towards us—an ill will which we have reciprocated with a policy of diplomatic isolation and military containment—is not an expression of isolation as much as of an intense political relationship. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the United States has a "revolutionary alliance" with Communist China. To be sure, this is not an "alliance" in Western terms of interstate dealings carried out within a framework of international law and diplomatic conventions. Rather, it is cast in Mao Tse-tung's view that "U.S. imperialism"

is one of a series of enemies allied to his cause of uniting and motivating the Chinese people, through tension and hatred, for the tasks of creating a new society.

Earlier in this discussion it was suggested that confrontation and struggle with enemies have been essential elements in Mao's method of motivating China's peasants out of their traditional political passivity. The hated landlord, the warlord and the foreign invader have formed one important pole in the dialectical struggle between the forces of social "progress" and their "reactionary" oppressors. And in Mao's view of political processes, this tension and conflict can drive history forward. In the years following the Communist attainment of power in China, Mao has sought to maintain the validity of his particular formula for mass political participation; yet with earlier enemies now defeated, Mao has seen the possibility that his revolution may die from a flagging of the people's will to struggle. The feared passivity of China's peasant majority remains his greatest enemy—perhaps second only to his concern that the Communist party will turn into a new exploiting elite. Given these concerns, Mao has sought to identify new "enemies," to provide that tension which will maintain the dynamism of social change.

Unwittingly, the United States Asian presence has worked to give Mao a new image of "imperialism" which he has used as a foil to mobilize China's peasant millions for continuing domestic political and social battles. Our "containment" posture has helped to maintain an air of threat and tension which sustains the validity of the Maoist formula for political participation in an underdeveloped society. The Chinese Communist party paper, *People's Daily*, could state the virtues of the United States "enemy" with little self-consciousness:

The Chinese people's great enemy is U.S. imperialism. This enemy is indeed most hateful and harmful to us; *but we must see that its existence also has a beneficial effect on us.* To have a ferocious enemy like U.S. imperialism glowering at us and threatening us day and night will make us Chinese people always bear in mind the danger of war while living in peace and

raise our vigilance a hundred fold; will keep us always on the alert and enable our enthusiasm to burst forth; can help the Chinese people always to maintain preparedness and sharpen our fighting spirit. Wanton U.S. imperialist aggression and intimidation can further raise our political consciousness, strengthen our unity and enhance our combat readiness.²

Ultimately, China herself can help resolve the paradox of the "revolutionary alliance" with the United States, for the current "Cultural Revolution" has exposed to the world the Long March generation's questioning of the Maoist formula of emotional mass struggle as a path to modernization. In more recent days, as Mao's personal formula of struggle politics has been called into question by its domestic and foreign failures, the sense of *external* threat and, in particular, the "people's war" now rending Vietnam have been used by the Maoists to reaffirm to doubting Chinese comrades the continuing *domestic* relevance of mass mobilization and struggle politics as the most effective way to deal with the country's problems.

Attacks on Mao's opponents within the top leadership to the effect that they have been "soft on capitalism" suggest that influential Chinese may have advocated "reconciliation" with the United States, and reduction of aid to foreign insurgencies. Hopefully, out of China's present domestic turmoil will come a new generation of leaders, a group of men who will no longer see confrontation and struggle with domestic and foreign enemies as necessary to China's own social progress.

² Observer, "A Retort to Bundy," *People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao)*, February 20, 1966; emphasis added.

THE POPULATION OF CHINA

(Continued from page 146)

of first parity and reduction of completed family size is consistent with this position. To date, however, this program has been left largely to the discretion of parents, and

has been disguised in the familiar rhetoric of maternal and child health. Clearly such measures are not adequate to the problem, and much more will be necessary to bring the cycle of population growth to a close. Moreover, it is questionable whether the government has the capacity for such action even if it decides to undertake it.

PROSPECTS FOR POPULATION CONTROL IN THE FUTURE

Prerequisites for a program of family planning are fairly clear. Success in this area requires a government fully committed to the plan, appropriate contraceptive techniques, a distribution system that brings the techniques to the people and motivational preparedness on the part of the recipient population to ensure their effective use of these services. In the absence of any of these conditions, it is doubtful that a major reduction in the birth rate can be effected.¹⁸

In the case of China, there are persuasive reasons for believing that an extensive program of family planning could be carried out in the near future. Specifically, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Chinese government can act decisively and effectively in carrying out a national program—whatever the specific content—if it is convinced that such action is necessary for the preservation of the political order. Evidently, such a conclusion has not yet been reached concerning the necessity for immediate population control, but such a decision may well be imminent.

Should such a program be inaugurated, it will not lack suitable contraceptive means to achieve its purpose. Initial success with the intra-uterine device, abortion and sterilization, both within China and among people of Chinese cultural background outside of China, suggest that such techniques would be both acceptable and effective in a mass program of birth control. The question remains as to whether the distribution network and the medical structure are capable of providing such services on a national scale. Irene Taeuber and Leo Orleans conclude that with sufficient priority in recruitment, finance

¹⁸ An excellent appraisal of this question is provided by Taeuber and Orleans, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–54. The following analysis is based on their conclusions.

and training such services could be provided throughout China in the near future.

This leaves the most significant question of all unanswered; namely, whether the people can be motivated to bring their reproduction into line with a national norm of two or three children per family. Once again, there are grounds for optimism.

Paradoxically, the same demographic conditions which produced the present crisis may also contribute to its solution, in that the transition from slow to rapid population growth has produced a disproportionate number of young people who may be particularly receptive to the policies and requests of the Communist regime. In short, "there is a high potential for change in the increasing predominance of youth [in Chinese society]."¹⁷ And, if the malleability of this group can be capitalized upon, it could mean the institutionalization of new family size norms in the rising generation. Conversely, if such an appeal is not made, the sword will cut in the other direction, with this enlarged group of young adults contributing to the acceleration rather than the control of population growth.

Finally, one may note that the very ideological system which has produced such myopia and resistance to demographic reality may also have within it a set of values which are inherently opposed to uncontrolled fertility. I have in mind the positive effect of socialism upon the status of women, which takes the usual form of providing those legal, political, social, educational and economic freedoms traditionally denied to the female. The result is an enlarged sphere for women which militates against their participation in a system of unregulated reproduction. Incidentally, this was the case in Russia¹⁸ and there is no reason why we should not anticipate the same trend in China.

CONCLUSION

In any analysis of China's population, one must ultimately settle for an impressionistic

portrait. The more precise details necessarily elude us, or are subject to unresolvable controversy; yet the total impression is vivid.

We are left with the conclusion that China's population is between 700 and 800 million, and that it has been growing at an unprecedented rate—of between 1.5 and 2.5 per cent—since the revolution. In the absence of significant reductions in fertility or increases in mortality this process of rapid growth will necessarily continue in the future. The resulting increase in population—estimated at perhaps 15 million per year—will obviously place an intolerable burden on both the political and economic structures. It will delay if not preclude the possibility of rapid economic development, and it will keep the individual citizen locked in a hopeless cycle of low income and poor diet. Conversely, a marked reduction in fertility, with a corresponding decline in the rate of population growth, would reverse this pattern and facilitate the achievement of economic and political stability.

Fortunately, in the case of China, what is necessary is also possible. Analysis of the conditions required for a successful program of birth control reveals no insurmountable obstacles in the path of such an effort: i.e., suitable contraceptive techniques exist; the medical profession is prepared to bring them to the people; and the people are potentially receptive to their use. The whole movement lacks only the catalyst of total government commitment, and there are signs that such support may not be far off.

In the last few years the leadership has permitted and encouraged family planning and could easily reestablish its high priority in national planning. That it will do so seems a reasonable assumption, barring another excursion into the world of ideological illusion. In this connection, one can only hope that the painful recollection of the social and economic consequences of such mystical excesses in the past—particularly the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution"—will serve to keep the oriental Alice away from the looking-glass.

¹⁷ Taeuber and Orleans, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

¹⁸ See William Peterson, *The Politics of Population* (New York: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 103-125.

THE ECONOMY AND THE REVOLUTION

(Continued from page 140)

tons of steel (up a million tons from 1965), and about 250 million tons of coal and lignite (130 million tons in 1957, and perhaps 210 million tons in 1965).¹² The figures, to repeat, are informed guesses and the most one can say is that in 1966 there was no discernible evidence of an industrial crisis, and probably some improvement.

The picture changed radically in 1967, after the cultural revolution was carried into the economy. A new note of urgency and worry was struck in Mainland reports, side by side with the usual references to "great upsurge" and "unprecedented achievements." A socialist recession appears to have developed rapidly, gathering momentum as the troubled months dragged on. The situation seems to have deteriorated further in 1968, as the longer-term effects of the cultural upheaval began to be felt, chief among them the lack of competent leadership at the plant level, and worker restlessness.

The signs pointing to a deteriorating situation in industry may be summed up as follows:

1. In the winter of 1967-1968 a serious coal shortage developed partly because of fights, skirmishes, riots and strikes in coal mines. At the Lungmen colliery in Loyang, for example, "civil war" had raged for six months prior to February, 1968. Similar trouble had apparently hit the Fushun collieries in Liaoning Province, a major source of coal for the key Anshan steel works. Factionalism and anarchism reigned in the coal mines of Shansi Province. Since China is almost wholly dependent on coal for the run-

ning of her industry and railroads, shortages in this sector were bound to have adverse repercussions throughout the industrial economy.¹³

2. There have been practically no reports in 1967 and the first half of 1968 from some of China's most important industrial areas of Szechwan and Kansu. Even during the cultural revolution, when information of any kind was scarce, good performance would have been praised to the skies as a manifestation of the inspirational power of Mao Tse-tung's thought. A similar information blackout was imposed on the once much vaunted Taching Oil fields. For about two years previous to 1967, Taching and the "Taching spirit" were the themes of a mass propaganda campaign illustrating the economic benefits to be derived from Mao study. It is an interesting comment on the sort of data one gets out of China these days that, in spite of millions of words written on the subject of Taching, the field's exact location is not known to this day.

3. Anarchism, factionalism, groupism, sectarianism, "mountain-topism," and all the other sins attributed to those who oppose the cultural revolution, have been mentioned in connection with the Anshan steel works and in the steel city of Wuhan. A month after the installation of a Municipal Revolutionary Committee in Wuhan (March, 1968) "acute class struggle" was still being talked about on the radio and in the press.

4. Urgent calls to "make revolution thriftily" were being broadcast in the spring and summer of 1968. These appeals were addressed primarily to factories and farms.

5. Railroad transportation has been seriously disrupted in 1967 by strikes, sabotage and pitched battles between warring factions of railroad workers and between workers and students. Particularly disturbing for the Chinese has been the paralysis which gripped the important railway junction of Chengchow, but trouble from other centers has also been reported, if in veiled language.¹⁴

6. Most analysts seem to agree that the crucial chemical industry has been affected

¹² *Ten Great Years*; also Arthur G. Ashbrook, "Main Lines of Chinese Communist Economic Policy," in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Vol. I, p. 25; R. M. Field, "Chinese Communist Industrial Production," in *op. cit.*, Appendix C, Table 9.

¹³ *China News Analysis*, No. 697, January 23, 1968, pp. 1-7.

¹⁴ Colina MacDougall, "Nothing to Boast About," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 25, 1968, pp. 221-223.

by disruption in supplies and by labor discipline problems. Almost complete silence has surrounded the cement and construction industries for months.

It is reasonable to assume that one of the major issues in dispute between the Maoists and their opponents—between romantic, guerrilla Communists and the party and government bureaucrats, technicians, and managers in charge of the day-to-day conduct of economic affairs—has been and remains to this day the question of economic incentives. Beneath all the shouting and pushing, there is the unresolved problem of feeding and clothing the millions.

The Maoist utopians believe that increases in production and productivity are a function of the political will, that asceticism and unshakable political faith can literally move mountains, that apparently insuperable problems can be solved if only the spirit is willing. Material incentives, the normal human desire for a better life now, are seen by these people as dangerous manifestations of petty bourgeois flabbiness.

The Communist pragmatists deny this and see in it an invitation to disaster. The dividing line between the two groups is perhaps not clear, but it is there. From a violent struggle at the top of the Communist pyramid, the cultural revolution has in the last two years moved to the basic issues of the people's livelihood, and has increasingly become a question of physical survival. The gap between minimum material needs and availabilities is still being met partly by imported grain, but more and more by a leftist philosophy of poverty which finds in destitution and self-denial the supreme human virtue.

The trouble is that even the slightest manifestation of empiricism, in the state of China's present madness, is branded as Soviet-type revisionism. The time to reverse gear is now no longer an academic question; it is an absolute necessity if so-called socialism in China is to survive, and beyond that, if China is not to plunge once again into bitter interne-cine warfare.

CHINA AND THE WESTERN WORLD

(Continued from page 152)

the events in Peking as "incompatible with normal relations between states."¹⁵ The acting Chinese chargé d'affaires was summoned to the British Foreign Office late on the night of August 22 to be told the attack on the British mission was "in contravention of all norms of diplomatic behavior."¹⁶ The Foreign Office spokesman said that Britain required an explanation of the attack, assurances of protection of embassy personnel and property, and compensation for the damage.

Matters had patently gone too far; China was now almost completely isolated diplomatically—and militarily. At the beginning of September, by Japanese report, Chou En-lai instructed the Red Guards that they were not to intrude into diplomatic missions: they might only demonstrate outside.¹⁷ No imperialist or revisionist bastions had fallen; the Red Guards International had not come into being. The confrontation between China and the United States continued unrelaxed, with its prime focus in Southeast Asia. China still lay largely defenseless under the threat of massed American sea and air power.

The United States concepts of 1954 were maintained in 1968. Hanson W. Baldwin, who has often shown himself close to Pentagon thinking, looked at the basic instability and the strategic importance of "the continent of Asia and its bordering islands and surrounding seas and oceans," and held that, even after the Vietnamese War ended, the United States should remain effectively engaged, to counter the outward thrust from the Eurasian heartland.¹⁸ United States diplomacy, Baldwin said, should be directed at encouraging the Sino-Soviet rift; United States military bases should be maintained on

¹⁵ *Le Monde*, August 20–21, 1967.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, August 23, 1967.

¹⁷ *Le Monde*, September 9, 1967.

¹⁸ Hanson W. Baldwin, "After Vietnam—What Military Strategy in the Far East?" *The New York Times Magazine*, June 9, 1968, pp. 36–87 passim.

at least Guam, Okinawa and the Philippines; consideration should be given to the filling of the "vacuum" of the Indian Ocean; and "the right fist of tremendous nuclear power" should be "cocked" ready to strike.

Clearly, Baldwin was primarily concerned with China, for he said that the United States should make it clear that it will not undertake unlimited engagement of its own troops in a continental ground war in Asia while limiting itself as regards weapons and methods.

Certainly any direct involvement with massed Chinese Communist ground forces on the Asiatic mainland should imply immediate technological escalation. Such escalation might involve the use of exotic new conventional weapons, or the utilization under carefully restricted conditions, where targets and geography are favorable, of small nuclear weapons for *defensive* purposes.

UNCHANGING GEOPOLITICS

The fundamental geopolitical situation facing Chinese strategists today is one in which the United States still proposes to "contain" China by maintaining American military bases, manned by American garrisons, on its sea periphery, with the use of nuclear power if need be. In his declining years, Mao thought to implement the ancient Chinese principle of *ta t'ung*, universalism, by projecting a revolutionary class struggle of his making into the realm of international affairs. But the main factors which led the Chinese "revisionists" to oppose Mao on foreign policy grounds in September, 1965, still govern today, perhaps with even greater force. Common sense suggests to the Chinese pragmatists, as well as to other observers, that there can be no reconciliation between Peking and Washington, for all of the talk of "building bridges," until such time as the issue of Formosa is settled; and that, even then, the United States in accord with its present thinking *would continue in its effort to contain China and police Asia*. Consequently, by pragmatic Chinese logic, the war against "imperialism" must be given priority over the war against "revisionism": the American military encirclement, after all, touches upon

the fundamental issue of China's national survival.

By the end of 1967, a change in China's foreign policy line was clearly imperative. It has now begun. There are no longer demonstrations before Western—or other—embassies in Peking. A directive has been issued stating that all foreigners in China are resident there by courtesy of the Chinese leadership, not of popular organizations, and are not to be attacked—as if the earlier attacks on the embassies had not been sanctioned by Mao himself. And Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, subjected to abuse and attack in 1967, has by 1968 been rehabilitated.

All this time, Mao's mortality weighs heavily upon him. It is to be anticipated as probable that, as power slips further from his faltering hands, the Chinese pragmatists will reach out, take hold, and set the Chinese ship of state on a course different from that heretofore followed by Great Helmsman Mao Tse-tung. In view of China's great weaknesses and parallel great needs, Peking can be expected to return to something like the intermediate-zone policy of 1964. In that mellower character, China would before long almost certainly play a new and enhanced role in the community of nations. Assuming further a measured reconciliation with the Soviet Union, her only remaining dangerous enemy would then be the United States.

This suggests that in the end, barring a nuclear Armageddon, the American-as-Western strategy of containment of China must fail. The reasons are clear. First, as suggested by Chiang Kai-shek a quarter of a century ago, Western imperialism at least has played out its role in Asia. Second, Asian sentiment and, increasingly, European sentiment are inclined toward coexistence with China, rather than forceful containment—to say nothing of nuclear annihilation. With either a compromise political settlement or a military holocaust in Vietnam, where the American-Chinese confrontation is avowedly being resolved, there promises to be such alienation of Asians from United States policies as would preclude further acceptance of

the policing of Asia by the United States.

As *The Economist* put it shortly after the Maoist purge began in late 1965, "a country can be discovered more than once."¹⁹ If China needs to discover the world, "the West" is also under the necessity of rediscovering China.

¹⁹ "Seeing China Straight," *The Economist*, October 23, 1965, pp. 360-61.

CHINA AND JAPAN

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long as that is strong, the close Tokyo-Washington ties will make highly difficult any political rapprochement between Tokyo and Peking.

The Japanese relationship with North America, moreover, is only one in a significant series of developments that might well determine Pacific relations in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The United States, Australia and Latin America have become the important Japanese markets and sources for raw materials, replacing the importance which China, South and Southeast Asia held for the Japanese in the 1930's.⁶ In 1967, for the first time, Japan became Australia's best customer. This also marked the only time that any country outranked the United Kingdom in buying Australia's products. Similarly, the United States has replaced the United Kingdom as Australia's major supplier.

These break-throughs could signal the beginnings of a Pacific Common Market which might attract the smaller powers in Asia much as the European Common Market has attracted nations in the Eastern Mediterranean and former colonies in Africa. Such a trend might have been set in motion with

⁶ Seymour Broadbridge and Martin Collick, "Japan's International Policies," *International Affairs* (London), XLIV (April, 1968), pp. 240-253.

⁷ The best analysis of this development is provided by Peter Drysdale, "Japan, Australia and Pacific Economic Integration," *Australia's Neighbours*, 4th series, nos. 50-51 (November-December, 1967), pp. 7-8.

⁸ Paul F. Langer, "Japan's Relations With China—A Look Into the Future," a study published in February, 1965 by RAND Corporation, p. 9.

the meeting of the Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee in Tokyo in 1963, and the organization in 1967 of the Pacific Basic Economic Cooperation Committee comprised of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Japanese officials have emphasized they have no long-term plans for integration along the lines of the European Common Market, but some key spokesmen, including Foreign Minister Miki, are committed to a Pacific free trade area which would short-circuit threats of American protectionism and provide a funnel for Japanese aid and influence into the southern Pacific area.⁷ Such a process would further isolate China in the Asian councils.

THE TOUCHSTONE OF TAIWAN

Nor have these economic transformations left untouched that touchstone of Chinese-Western relations—Taiwan. Japan is Taiwan's main trading partner and the United States ranks second; together they provide 70 per cent of the island's imports and take 40 per cent of her exports. Japan, moreover, believes that Taiwan must remain non-Communist, for in other hands the island could cut the Japanese shipping lanes to Southeast Asian markets and raw materials.⁸ Japan has devoted herself to a two-China policy, agreeing with the United States at the United Nations that the seating of Communist China is an "important question" which requires a two-thirds agreement rather than a simple majority vote.

The Sato government and its successors consequently have several options for Japan's future overseas development. The only pressure Sato now receives for pursuing a more vigorous China policy comes from some businessmen, from Miki's idea that Japan might serve as a bridge between Peking and the United States, and from dissident members of the L.D.P. who view Chinese relations as a tactic for their own political advancement.

Sato does not have to worry at present about the Japanese Communist party. Holding only five seats in the Diet, the 250,000-member party is governed by intellectuals

whose concern for an outdated Marxism is greater than their talent for pragmatic politics. The Communists had long been pro-Peking, having originated in the 1920's with the Chinese party. The Japanese Communist leader, 75-year-old Sanzo Nosaka, was extremely close to Mao during the days in the Yen'an caves. After 1960, the Sino-Soviet split divided the Japanese Communists, however. And the pro-Soviet faction, led by Yushio Shiga, gained adherents after the Cultural Revolution and the Chinese hard-line on Vietnam threatened further to divide the international Communist movement.

In March, 1966, a Japanese Communist delegation traveled to Peking to discuss growing difficulties. The result was such acrimony that not even the usual joint communiqué could be issued. In the summer of 1967, two Japanese Communists were beaten by Chinese at the Peking airport. The Japanese blasted the Mao group for "extreme leftist opportunism and big-power-conscious chauvinism," adding that the Cultural Revolution was "feudalistic, unscientific dogmatism quite alien to Marxism-Leninism." When, however, a top-level group of Soviet officials visited Tokyo in the spring of 1968 to gain Japanese Communist support for an international meeting which would isolate China, Sanzo refused to commit himself. The Japanese Communist party seems to be moving into a third-force alignment with the Rumanians, the North Koreans and the Cubans.

The main opposition party, the Socialists, are closer to Peking. When the latter split on the Sino-Soviet issue, Socialist party chairman Dozo Sasaki took a strong pro-Peking stand. This brought a division among the Socialists themselves and losses in the 1967 elections. Sasaki's position also badly retarded Socialist-Communist cooperation in local elections. The anti-Sasaki wing accused the party chairman of selling out to trading companies doing business with China. The split has moved down to the student level.

⁹ An elaboration of this triangular relationship can be found in "Fifty-Year Flirtation: Our Illusory Affair With Japan," *The Nation*, CCVI (March 11, 1968), pp. 330-338.

The Japanese-Chinese Friendship Movement divided into pro- and anti-Peking factions in mid-1967. The two "Friendship" groups promptly got into a fist-fight over who would control the meeting hall in Tokyo.

Aside from their internal division, the Socialists have continually failed during the postwar period to gain more than the one-third *Diet* seats they need to make revisions in the Constitution. The Premier's first concern is maintaining Japan's economic progress, for while that continues the opposition parties will be largely impotent. Sato can accomplish this by choosing wisely among the various options opening to him. The most important of these are the continuation of Japan's flourishing relationships with the United States and Australia (which could lead to bigger things), and those with the Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. China is farther down the list.

Sino-Japanese relations no longer follow the pre-1960 pattern. The Chinese do not provide the key Japanese market; geographical proximity is no longer the magnet of centuries past; the ideological gap makes less visible the generations of cultural similarities; and younger Japanese no longer have the feelings for this unfamiliar China which their ancestors possessed. The United States, not China, is the key to Japanese foreign policy.⁹ A continued over-commitment of the United States to the Western Pacific, which could exacerbate internal Japanese politics and challenge Japan's economic expansion overseas, could push Tokyo to forsake its other options in favor of an active, primary policy of courting China. At that point, the Japanese would forget about pachinko and baseball, and the Pacific Era of American History would come to an end.

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN VIEW

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development in a generally depressing pattern. It is strongly reminiscent, however, of Aesop's tale of the contest between the Sun and the Wind. Each sought to cause a traveler be-

low to remove his coat. The Wind, certain of his ability to blow the coat off with sheer force and bluster, found instead that his efforts only led the traveler to grasp his coat more tightly—in an effort to protect himself. The Sun then took his turn. With his benign warmth he soon caused the traveler to loosen his coat, and shortly afterward to remove the protective covering altogether.

The leaders of China, a land where proverbs are highly regarded, have yet to apply Aesop's fable in Southeast Asia. For it has seemed that precisely to the extent that China has adopted a policy of bluster, reflected for example in her support for a number of insurgent groups in Southeast Asia, leaders in the region have become increasingly concerned with defense and security. If China hopes to reduce this trend, she will need to contemplate a return to the period of "peaceful co-existence." Few signs today suggest a turn in that direction.

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

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nature of relations between Communist *parties* depends on the leaders who decree the party line according to their own lights. If the concepts of strategy and tactics of the party leaders in different countries coincide, relations are smooth. If they do not, none of the parties will accept the others' interpretations and beliefs, and the result is strained relations. If the leadership changes, the disturbance may be smoothed over or formerly good relations may deteriorate. While this is a world-wide phenomenon, it is particularly pronounced in countries where the decision-making is in the hands of party leaders who are not accountable to the people.

WHERE ARE WE?

Where does this leave us in the Sino-Soviet conflict? The Kremlin has learned to be flexible; it has tolerated polycentric communism to an extent undreamed of 15 years ago. But it still wants to create a united

Communist front and revitalize the world Communist movement, if possible under its general guidance (not necessarily domination).

Compromise is not a Communist characteristic. But it stands to reason that the Soviet leadership, which has behaved with relative circumspection toward the Chinese, may concede a few points in order to achieve a rapprochement. The basic Soviet attitude toward China is unlikely to change considerably even if new collective leaders take over from the present regime.

In China, the situation is far more complex. Maoism is still the motto of the Chinese People's Republic. While everybody claims he is for Mao, a number of factions have arisen which are at odds with his leadership. Since the destruction of regional party organizations, the armed forces have taken over and are virtually ruling the country. But even the army is fractionalized. And while it is probable that Mao's successor will be a military man, it remains to be seen whether he will be a modified Maoist or whether he will try to follow a more rational policy which eventually may lead to cooperation with the Soviet army professionals and to a rapprochement with Moscow.

As long as Mao and his close followers—particularly his politically virulent wife—are still in power, relations between Peking and Moscow may get worse before they get better. Gradually, after Mao, conditions may change, perhaps not immediately but in the near future. The wounds the two Communist countries have inflicted on one another will take time to heal. Many points of contention—historical and contemporary—will remain. Yet we should not forget that changes in a Communist state can be effected quickly if the party leadership so decides. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1940 remains one of the best examples of sudden turnabouts.

Any such change would have worldwide ramifications and would compel Western governments to revise their political thinking. In their planning, they would do well to consider such a contingency.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of July, 1968, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

(See also *West Germany*)

July 3—In notes to the Soviet Union, the U.S., France and Great Britain protest East German restrictions on travel to West Berlin.

July 29—*The New York Times* reports that the Soviet Union has rejected the U.S. protest against East German travel restrictions.

Central American Common Market

July 6—U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson arrives in San Salvador to meet with the Central American Presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. To help spur Central American economic integration, Johnson offers a \$30-million loan to the Central American development bank; U.S. loans totalling \$35 million will be made to the various states.

Czech Crisis

July 9—Authoritative sources in Prague report that the ruling Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist party voted against attending a meeting with party leaders from the U.S.S.R. and 4 other East European Communist states (Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria) to discuss Czech liberalization measures. A Czech statement issued after the Presidium meeting offered to confer singly with Czechoslovakia's allies.

July 10—Two regiments of Soviet troops that participated in Warsaw Pact maneuvers held in Czechoslovakia last month are delaying their departure. They were scheduled to leave on July 1.

July 12—Czech Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek says that his government will meet with its allies in a series of bilateral conversations,

but will not attend a proposed Bloc meeting.

July 15—A halt in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is noted by Czech television stations. Speculation has arisen that the U.S.S.R. has ordered the delay while Soviet and other Communist leaders attend a meeting in Warsaw that began yesterday.

At a news conference, Lieutenant General Vaclav Prchlik, the Czech Communist party's chief spokesman on military affairs, demands that the command of the Warsaw Pact be placed on a rotating basis to give equality to all Pact members.

July 16—It is reported that the U.S.S.R., Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria insist on a meeting with the Czech government within 2 weeks.

July 17—Soviet Communist party First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev demands that Czech leaders meet with Warsaw Pact leaders in Kosice, Czechoslovakia. A large group of Soviet soldiers are expected to be in the area on their way home.

July 19—The Central Committee of the Czech Communist party unanimously endorses the firm stand taken by Communist party First Secretary Alexander Dubcek in the face of Soviet demands.

July 21—Soviet troops remain within Czechoslovakia. Their departure was scheduled to have been completed today.

July 22—Some Soviet troops recently withdrawn from Czechoslovakia are stationed less than 3 miles from the Czech border in Poland.

The Soviet government renews its demands for permission to station Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia on the West German border.

July 23—Soviet army maneuvers are under way at many points near the Czech border.

Dubcek says Czech reforms do not threaten the Communist bloc and that he will not retreat on planned liberalization.

July 28—Members of the Presidium of the Communist party arrive in Kosice, Czechoslovakia, to meet with Soviet leaders. Discussions will take place at an unnamed site nearby.

July 29—Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, President Nikolai V. Podgorny and Brezhnev arrive in Cierna, Czechoslovakia, with members of the Soviet Politburo. They are greeted by 16 members of the Czech Presidium.

Disarmament

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

July 16—A message from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson to a new session of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva announces that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will soon decide on a meeting place for negotiations to limit missile systems.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

July 1—The last tariff barriers among the 6 Common Market members are eliminated; in addition, their external tariffs are aligned.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt)

July 1—Gatt announces that 18 nations, including the 6 Common Market nations, are reducing tariffs today; other nations so acting are not yet listed by Gatt.

International Monetary Crisis

July 11—*The New York Times* reports that central bankers from major Western nations have arranged \$1.3 billion worth of short-term credits to France to help bolster the franc. The bankers have assured Great Britain that if "satisfactory terms" can be agreed on, she will receive up to \$2 billion in credits to support the pound sterling.

Middle East Crisis

July 2—*The New York Times* reports that

construction is under way to establish Jewish housing settlements ringing the northern and eastern edges of the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem, in defiance of a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning any changes in the status of Jerusalem.

July 4—In London, diplomatic sources report that the U.A.R. has indicated to the U.N. special representative in the Middle East, Gunnar V. Jarring, that it is willing to accept U.N. peace-keeping troops in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula as part of a Middle East peace settlement.

U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser arrives in Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders.

July 5—In Jerusalem, Israeli officials informally disclose that Israel will not accept a U.N. peace-keeping force in the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula in place of a settlement directly worked out with the U.A.R.

July 7—It is reported that yesterday the Jordan government penalized 8 Arab judicial officials in the west-bank area because they have cooperated with the Israelis. They are the first Arab administrators in the west-bank area to be punished; they are deprived of their pensions and civil service status.

July 8—In Cairo, diplomatic sources report that the U.A.R. is prepared to allow Israeli cargoes to pass through the Suez Canal if Israeli troops withdraw from a strip of desert on the east bank of the Canal.

In Jerusalem, an Israeli official says that Israeli evacuation of the Canal's east bank must be part of a Middle East peace treaty.

July 9—The Governor of Suez, Hamid Mahmoud, accuses Israeli soldiers of opening fire yesterday deliberately and without provocation on residential sectors of this port town on the Suez Canal. Forty-three civilians were killed and 67 wounded.

July 15—Meeting at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, 100 Palestine Arab leaders from Arab commando groups agree to coordinate guerrilla activities in Israeli-occupied territories.

July 18—*The New York Times* reports that

"well-qualified Arab informants" have reported that last month 2 Israeli Mirage jet planes flew over U.A.R. President Nasser's home on the outskirts of Cairo on reconnaissance missions. One flight was at a level of 1,500 feet.

July 23—In an address before a congress of the Arab Socialist Union, President Nasser declares that Egypt must not prematurely enter another war against Israel.

July 24—*The New York Times* reports that Jordan's King Hussein was informed by Nasser that the U.A.R.'s armed forces will not be ready to fight Israel before 1970.

The Israeli government initiates diplomatic action to pressure Algeria to return the Israeli El Al jet airliner hijacked over the Mediterranean yesterday. Algeria is holding 12 Israeli passengers and the 10-man crew. Other passengers have been allowed to depart.

July 27—The Algerian government releases 10 Israeli women and children aboard the hijacked airliner.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

July 21—On the first of 4 trips to Latin America, Galo Plaza Lasso, former President of Ecuador and currently Secretary General of the Organization of American States, says that the region is confronted with a "barrier of silence" that does not permit the flow of information on the true conditions that prevail there.

Persian Gulf Sheikdoms

July 6—The sheiks of 9 Persian Gulf states meet and agree on a loose provisional form of federation.

United Nations

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam; Nigeria*)

July 10—At a news conference, U.N. Secretary General U Thant urges the Biafran rebel leaders to allow food supplies to be sent through federal territory for starving Biafrans.

War in Vietnam

July 3—The chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks, W. Averell Harriman, expresses

U.S. appreciation of Hanoi's decision to release 3 U.S. airmen. The 11th negotiating session is held by U.S. and North Vietnamese delegates.

July 5—North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces attack the U.S. base camp at Dau-tieng, 40 miles northwest of Saigon.

July 6—In a one-day trip to Paris, U.N. Secretary General U Thant confers with U.S. and North Vietnamese delegates.

July 8—*The New York Times* reports that in an interview in Grenoble, France, Richard A. Falk, Professor of International Law at Princeton University, declared that during his visit to Hanoi last month, North Vietnamese leaders referred to the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces as a third force between the Saigon regime and the Vietcong's National Liberation Front. The Alliance was established in April, 1968.

July 14—U.S. Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford arrives in Saigon. He says the U.S. plans to equip the South Vietnam Army and declares that "We plan to give weapons to ARVN forces—all of the ARVN forces—even at the expense of our forces" in reply to a query about the availability of American M-16 rifles.

July 16—Clifford meets with President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam.

July 17—It is reported that in an interview yesterday with David Schoenbrun of the American Broadcasting Company, Xuan Thuy, chief North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris talks, observed that "there have been no rocket attacks on Saigon for several weeks." There is speculation as to whether this remark is meant to draw attention to an act of restraint or good will by North Vietnam.

July 18—On the arrival of South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu for top-level talks in Honolulu, U.S. President Johnson reaffirms the U.S. commitment to help the South Vietnamese "defeat aggression. . ."

3 U.S. pilots are placed in the care of U.S. pacifists in Hanoi for the trip home.

July 19—In Honolulu, Thieu and Johnson confer.

July 20—At the end of the Honolulu conference, a joint communiqué is issued. President Johnson promises that no coalition government will be imposed on South Vietnam: "The people of South Vietnam—and only the people of South Vietnam—have the right to choose the form of their government." Thieu offers a "one-man-one-vote" political system to any Vietcong rebels who relinquish their arms.

Warsaw Pact

(See *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

World Council of Churches

July 5—The Fourth Assembly of the World Council of Churches meeting in Uppsala, Sweden, receives a message from Pope Paul VI, the first sent by a Pope since the Council was formed in 1948.

ALGERIA

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

BOLIVIA

(See also *Chile*)

July 22—President René Barrientos Ortuño declares a state of siege following violent clashes between police and politicians. The opposition parties have demanded Barrientos' resignation following the flight to Chile of Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas.

July 25—All 12 cabinet members resign in the continuing political crisis over the Ernesto (Che) Guevara diary. The Social Democratic party withdraws from the 4-party governing coalition.

July 27—President Barrientos appoints a new cabinet consisting largely of military men who are his personal friends.

BRAZIL

July 25—Former President Janio Quadros is questioned and later released by federal police, following his criticism of the government of President Artur da Costa e Silva. Quadros was forbidden to make public statements after his resignation from office in August, 1961.

CANADA

July 5—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau announces several new cabinet appointments. Eight new members are added; 15 are moved to new posts; 6 remain unchanged.

July 6—The new cabinet is sworn in.

July 18—A strike by Canadian postal workers halts all mail service. An embargo on mail from outside Canada is ordered. Postal workers have refused a 50-cent-an-hour increase, demanding 75 cents.

CHILE

July 18—The U.S. Federal Communications Commission announces that it has authorized the first satellite communication service between Chile and the U.S.

July 20—It is reported that the Government is intensifying its efforts to combat the effects of the worst drought in 102 years.

Chile places her troops along the Bolivian border on alert following the announcement that former Bolivian Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas will receive special consideration on his request for asylum in Chile. He has been charged with responsibility for providing Cuba with a copy of Che Guevara's diary. (See also *Bolivia*.)

July 21—A Government spokesman says that former Bolivian Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas has acknowledged passing a copy of Che Guevara's diary to Cuban agents in Bolivia.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

July 1—A joint editorial published in 3 Chinese newspapers takes a bland tone in discussing rightist opposition.

July 7—Three students at Tsinghua University are killed in clashes between rival groups. This brings to 18 the number of students at the University reported slain in current struggles over political doctrine.

July 13—Hong Kong sources reveal that a Canton newspaper, titled *Angry Waves of the West River*, described fighting in Wuchow during April and May. Hundreds

of rebel fighters are reported to have been killed; 2,000 buildings were reportedly destroyed.

July 15—*Nanfang Jih Pao*, official publication of the Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee, reports fighting between rival factions in Canton. Both groups claim to be Maoists.

July 18—The Kwangtung radio reports a fierce attack against "class enemies."

July 24—*Hsinhua*, the Chinese press agency, announces the signing of an economic and technical aid agreement between China and North Vietnam.

Reports from Canton indicate that government troops are firing on rival groups fighting in Kwangtung Province.

COLOMBIA

July 16—The Finance and Development Ministry announces the end of an 8-day dock strike, called over the refusal of the Port Association to recognize new union leadership.

CUBA

July 14—The newspaper *El Mundo* reports that Cuba has started work on her first experimental auto engine.

July 18—The first U.S. tourists to visit Cuba since diplomatic relations were broken in 1961 arrive in Havana from Spain. It is not known whether the 19 Americans have U.S. State Department consent to visit.

July 19—Speaking on television, Premier Fidel Castro predicts Cuba will double her farm output by 1970 and will be self-sufficient in rice by 1971.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

July 6—Regional meetings are held to elect 2,000 delegates to the national party congress planned for September, 1968.

DAHOMY

July 6—Four former presidents are barred from the country. Frontiers are closed and citizens need permission to leave the country, the military junta announces. Street demonstrations are prohibited.

FRANCE

(See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis*)

July 3—In a move to curb inflation, the government raises the basic interest rate from 3.5 per cent to 5 per cent. Higher taxes are forecast. Gold and dollar reserves have dropped \$1.09 billion in the past month.

July 10—President Charles de Gaulle names Maurice Couve de Murville as Premier to replace Georges Pompidou.

The Government announces a general amnesty to all prisoners serving sentences for acts connected with the Algerian war (1954-1962).

July 11—The Bank of France reports a continuing outflow of gold and foreign exchange. Reserves fell \$398 million in the past week.

July 12—Maurice Couve de Murville, Premier-designate, announces his new Cabinet, which will be very similar in membership to ex-Premier Pompidou's.

Unofficial reports put France's sale of gold to the United States for dollars at \$100 million. France also has borrowed \$600 million at short term from the United States Federal Reserve System in a "swap" to support the franc. Previously, France refused to join in "swaps" to support other currencies.

July 13—President de Gaulle warns that public order must be completely assured and says the Government will not tolerate further strikes and rebellion.

July 14—Minor rioting in the student quarter of Paris mars Bastille Day ceremonies.

July 16—Former Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is removed as chairman of the Finance Committee of the National Assembly. Giscard d'Estaing is a member of the Independent Republicans, former coalition partners of the Gaullists. Since the Gaullist party won a majority in the National Assembly, minority party support is no longer needed.

July 17—Premier Couve de Murville pledges basic domestic reforms within the year.

July 24—Education Minister Edgar Faure tells the National Assembly that the Government will modernize the educational

curriculum and ease shortages of teachers and classrooms.

July 25—French monetary experts announce the balance-of-payments deficit for 1968 will reach \$1.1 billion, because of the strikes.

July 29—Former Premier Pierre Mendes-France resigns from the Unified Socialist party following his defeat for the National Assembly in the June elections.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 5—Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger announces he will seek a United States guarantee against nuclear attack by the U.S.S.R. before West Germany will sign the nonproliferation treaty.

July 11—Former Mayor Heinrich Albertz of West Berlin urges full-scale recognition of East Germany to stabilize conditions in Central Europe.

July 13—Foreign Minister Willy Brandt announces that his Government will continue to work for an exchange of pledges with Communist bloc countries to renounce the use of force. The Soviet Union has demanded a permanent right to intervene in West German affairs as the price of such an agreement.

July 15—A clear affirmation of West Germany's legal rights in Berlin is requested by the West German government as talks are scheduled among the West German government and the United States, Great Britain and France.

July 24—Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder announces that West Germany is shifting her planned army maneuvers away from the site originally selected which is near the Czech border. Chancellor Kiesinger requested the move in view of the tense situation in Czechoslovakia. (See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*.)

GREECE

July 8—The new Justice Minister, Ioannis Triandafylopoulos, resigns following reports of cabinet disagreement over the drafting of the new constitution.

July 11—Publication of the proposed new constitution reveals that the powers of the monarchy are virtually eliminated; the task of protecting the regime is to be vested in the army.

ICELAND

July 1—Returns in the presidential election give archeologist Krisjan Eldjarn 64.9 per cent of the vote.

IRAQ

July 17—The fourth coup in 10 years is reported in Baghdad. President Abdel Rahman Arif and Premier Taher Yahya are deposed by a Revolutionary Command Council led by Major General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. The new Council is made up of members of the rightist wing of the Baathist party.

July 31—President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr is named Premier by the Revolutionary Command Council. A new cabinet is named.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis; Algeria*)

JAPAN

July 9—Final returns in the national elections give Premier Eisaku Sato's Liberal-Democratic party 137 seats out of 250 in the upper chamber. The results are considered a strong pro-U.S. vote.

July 27—An agreement for joint development of the northern region of Siberia is announced by the Japanese government. Soviet timber will be exchanged for Japanese heavy machinery and consumer goods.

MALAYSIA

July 15—The Malaysian government rejects the claims of the Philippines to the North Borneo state of Sabah. Talks, which have been proceeding over two months, collapse.

MEXICO

July 4—A public sale of 10 per cent of the stock in the Mexican subsidiary of the General Electric Company is hailed by Mexican officials. A government cam-

paign to "Mexicanize" foreign-owned companies has been carried on for several years.

July 30—Several thousand students riot in Mexico City in protest against police brutality in quelling earlier student disorders last weekend.

July 31—Student rioting spreads to the cities of Villahermosa and Jalapa. Mexico City is comparatively calm.

NIGERIA

July 4—International relief agencies propose use of an airstrip to land cargoes of food for besieged and starving Biafrans. The federal government has agreed to the use of overland routes for relief, but Biafra refuses to accept this.

July 5—Nigeria's federal government refuses to permit air shipment of food to Biafra.

July 7—A plane carrying food sent by the World Council of Churches is reported to have landed safely in Biafra. The plane carried 10 tons of food and medicines. Many thousands of tons per month are said to be needed.

July 11—The federal government has agreed to admit airlifted supplies to Biafra under the auspices of the International Red Cross.

July 14—Nwonye Otue, Biafran special representative to the U.N., appeals for airlifted relief supplies. Overland routes are ruled out because they have been mined by Biafra and to reopen them would permit invasion of Biafra by federal troops.

July 19—It is announced that agreement has been reached between the federal government and Biafran officials to resume negotiations to end the war.

July 23—The International Red Cross charters a DC-6 four-engine plane to help shuttle food and medicines to starving Biafrans.

The Vatican announces that Nigerian federal forces are shooting at planes flying food into Biafra.

July 26—Peace talks will begin in Addis Ababa on August 5, according to a communiqué from the negotiators.

PHILIPPINES, THE

(See also *Malaysia*)

July 20—President Ferdinand E. Marcos orders his ambassador home from Malaysia in protest over Malaysia's abrupt rejection of the Philippine claim to Sabah.

RHODESIA

(See also *United Kingdom*)

July 3—Prime Minister Ian Smith persuades a parliamentary caucus of the Rhodesian Front to retain black representation in Parliament under the proposed charter.

July 17—The Rhodesian Front party offers constitutional proposals calling for a Rhodesian chief of state in place of the present system under which the British monarch serves as chief of state.

July 22—Black terrorists infiltrating into Rhodesia across the Zambezi River have been bombed by Rhodesian Air Force jets.

July 27—Returning to Salisbury from Pretoria, Prime Minister Ian Smith says that guerrilla activities in Rhodesia and threats to the security of white South Africans were the subjects of his discussions with Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster of South Africa.

RUMANIA

July 20—The official Communist party newspaper *Scinteia* prints a front page editorial declaring any outside interference with Czechoslovakia's internal affairs inadmissible.

SPAIN

July 12—The Cabinet issues a decree placing the "Heir to the Throne" second to the Chief of State in order of ceremonial precedence. This places Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón first in line to succeed Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

July 13—The Spanish government requests increased U.S. military aid, a defense guarantee and increased jurisdiction over American servicemen stationed in Spain, in bargaining over renewal of U.S. military bases.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl. Czech Crisis*)

July 4—*Tass*, the Soviet press agency, an-

nounces the signing of a new military and economic agreement between the Soviet Union and North Vietnam.

July 10—Andrei D. Sakharov, a member of the Academy of Sciences and one of the developers of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, calls for full intellectual freedom, cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., and rejection of demagogic myths in a program to avert nuclear war.

July 11—The newspaper of the Communist party, *Pravda*, attacks Czech liberalization.

July 24—A new Soviet credit of \$66 million to Pakistan for the purchase of capital goods is announced by Pakistani officials.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

July 2—The Treasury announces a drop in gold and foreign exchange amounting to \$62.4 million in June, 1968.

July 11—Trade figures for June show a sharp reduction of Great Britain's deficit, the Board of Trade announces. The news strengthens the pound on the international market. (See also *Intl, Monetary Crisis*.)

Defense Minister Denis Healey discusses a White Paper outlining Britain's plans to take a larger part in NATO after her withdrawal of forces from areas east of Suez. Emphasis will be placed on increasing naval forces in the Mediterranean to offset growing Soviet strength in that area.

July 15—The House of Commons votes to extend mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. A previous vote was negated by action in the House of Lords.

July 23—The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, highest court in the Commonwealth, rules that Rhodesia has acted illegally since 1965.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

July 3—In Columbus, Ohio, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) opens its annual convention.

July 5—Moderate civil rights leader Roy

Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.), addresses members of CORE and appeals for their cooperation with other Negro groups to work for Negro benefits.

July 6—Speaking at the CORE convention, Director of the National Urban League Whitney Young, Jr., supports the concept of black power as a Negro goal and declares that black people no longer seek integration.

The Department of Justice reveals that it is initiating a massive court drive to force 159 Southern school districts in 9 states to formulate more effective desegregation plans.

July 7—Disaffected members of CORE leave the national convention, and plan to establish a new organization to press for Negro rights.

July 8—A federal court ruling on the first U.S. government desegregation suit filed in the North orders a suburban Chicago school district to desegregate its facilities and school bodies "forthwith."

July 9—Phil Hutchings, newly-elected head of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (S.N.C.C.), says that its new goal will be the establishment of a new black political party.

July 24—Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes withdraws all white policemen and National Guardsmen from Cleveland's predominantly Negro East Side, after 10 persons are reported killed and 15 wounded in rioting last night. The shooting began when snipers fired on a tow truck attempting to remove an abandoned automobile. Of the 7 dead civilians, 4 were associated with a black nationalist group. Some 500 Negro civilians will supplement a force of 125 Negro police to restore order.

July 25—Mayor Stokes terminates the Negro citizens' patrols in Cleveland's East Side and orders police and Ohio National Guardsmen back into the area; he notes that there has been "an easing of the tension."

July 27—The National Advisory Commission

on Civil Disorders reports that its studies reveal that a majority of Negroes justify urban rioting as a form of social protest.

Economy

July 24—The Treasury Department reports that in the month of June, in a major reversal of the trend of outflowing gold, \$213 million in gold flowed into the U.S.

July 30—The Treasury announces a federal budget deficit of \$25.4 billion for fiscal year 1968, the largest since World War II.

July 31—The Department of Labor announces that the Consumer Price Index for June rose 0.5 per cent, largest rise since February, 1966.

Foreign Policy

July 1—President Lyndon Johnson reveals that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to discuss limiting and reducing defensive antimissile systems and offensive nuclear weapons. The President makes the announcement as the U.S., Britain, the U.S.S.R. and 58 nonnuclear nations sign the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. asks the U.S.S.R. to return the troop transport plane with its 17-man crew and 214 servicemen, which the Soviets forced to land in the Kurile Islands after the plane "apparently strayed off course" while airlifting men for duty in Vietnam.

July 2—The U.S.S.R. releases the U.S. plane with its crew and troops; the U.S. has expressed regret over the accidental intrusion into Soviet airspace.

July 5—Bolivian President René Barrientos Ortuño visits President Johnson in Texas.

July 6—The Department of Defense announces that the U.S. will sell additional batteries of *Hawk* anti-aircraft missiles to Israel.

President Johnson arrives in San Salvador to confer with the Presidents of Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. (See also *Intl, Central American Common Market.*)

July 8—In a joint communiqué, the U.S. and Rumania announce that the two nations

have agreed to permit exchanges of scientists for scholarly and practical work, high-level contacts, and possible cooperation in the field of atomic energy.

July 11—President Johnson urges "all those bearing responsibility" to allow relief food to reach the starving Biafrans. (See also *Nigeria.*)

July 14—*Aeroflot*, the Soviet airline, and Pan American World Airways open the first direct air service between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

July 18—President Johnson meets South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in Honolulu for a conference on the progress of the war. (See also *Intl, War in Vietnam.*)

July 19—State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey denies Soviet charges that the U.S. is encouraging the Czechs to defy the Soviet Union. (See also *Intl, Czech Crisis.*)

July 22—A formal protest is made by the U.S. against continuing Soviet charges that the U.S. is involved in Czech "liberalization" and Czech intransigence toward the U.S.S.R.

Government

July 2—Attorney General Ramsey Clark asks Congress to abolish the death penalty for federal crimes; he asks that the sentences of prisoners on Death Row be reduced to life imprisonment.

July 10—Dr. Benjamin Spock, chaplain of Yale University William Sloane Coffin, Jr., and 2 others are sentenced to 2 years in federal prison after their conviction for conspiring to counsel evasion of the draft.

July 12—The Post Office Department announces that the residents of new developments, including new apartment complexes, will have to pick up their mail at designated post offices; in order to conserve postal manpower, mail carrier service will not be extended to such residents.

Delaware Republican Senator John J. Williams charges that President Johnson has ordered a lengthy compilation of a history of his administration that "empha-

sizes his achievements and forgets his mistakes.”

July 15—The 10 per cent surtax on personal incomes goes into effect.

July 19—The Senate Judiciary Committee ends hearings on the nomination of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas for Chief Justice; hearings on the appointment of Judge Homer Thornberry to the Supreme Court will start tomorrow. The hearings mark the first time a nominee for the post of Chief Justice has ever been questioned in Congress.

Coffin reveals that former U.S. Representative to the U.N. Arthur Goldberg will be his attorney in his appeal from a conviction for conspiring to counsel evasion of the draft.

July 27—The President signs 3 veterans benefit bills into law, permitting disabled veterans to receive rehabilitation on a part-time as well as a full-time basis; increasing federal payments to states for hospital care for veterans; increasing the allowable payments for veterans in nursing homes; extending the program of matching grants to the states for building nursing homes for 5 more years.

July 31—President Johnson urges other steel companies not to follow Bethlehem Steel's across-the-board price increase of 5 per cent, which he terms unreasonable.

Labor

July 10—The Department of Labor reports that the June labor force in the U.S. reached a record 80 million persons: 76.4 million employed and 3.6 million unemployed.

July 16—The Illinois Bell Telephone Company rejects a union suggestion that the company and the union submit their dispute to binding arbitration. In Chicago, electrical workers have been on strike for 70 days; telephones and equipment needed to televise the Democratic National Convention in Chicago cannot be installed until the strike is settled.

July 23—In Chicago, electrical workers say they will provide volunteer help to install

communications equipment for the Democratic National Convention so it can open as scheduled on August 26.

July 30—A 3-year contract is signed by the United Steelworkers and the conference of steel-producing companies. Wages are increased by at least 44¢ an hour, and several fringe benefits are added.

Military

July 3—General William C. Westmoreland becomes Army Chief of Staff.

July 13—The Air Force reveals that 4,900 Air National Guardsmen and Air Force reservists are being redeployed as individuals; the men were called to active duty after the *Pueblo* crisis in January, 1968.

Politics

July 7—Mrs. Charlene Mitchell, a 38-year-old Negro, is named as the U.S. Communist party's candidate for the Presidency; she is the first Communist presidential candidate nominated since 1940.

July 12—Campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination, Vice President Hubert Humphrey urges a foreign policy shift toward “reconciliation and peaceful engagement” of communism, rather than confrontation and containment.

July 13—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller outlines a 4-stage plan to end the war in Vietnam within 6 months. The Governor seeks the Republican presidential nomination.

July 18—Former Vice President Richard Nixon is endorsed in his effort to win the Republican presidential nomination by former President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

July 19—In an interview with editors of *The New York Times*, Rockefeller reveals opposition to a coalition government in South Vietnam until after free elections.

July 20—Through an aide, Humphrey agrees to a televised discussion of campaign issues with Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, who is also seeking the Democratic presidential nomination.

July 25—Illinois Senator Charles H. Percy declares his support for Rockefeller's candidacy.

July 26—Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy announces that he will not accept the Democratic nomination as the vice-presidential candidate, for “purely personal reasons”; his decision is “final, firm, and not subject to further consideration.”

Supreme Court

(See also *Government*)

July 5—In his first news conference since he tendered his resignation as Chief Justice, Earl Warren defends President Johnson's right to appoint new members to the Supreme Court. If the Senate does not confirm Associate Justice Abe Fortas as his successor, Warren declares, he will return to the Court when its fall session opens in October.

URUGUAY

July 2—A 24-hour strike called by the National Workers Convention to protest austerity measures results in the mobilization of 3,000 former soldiers to keep public services operating.

July 4—Employees of two large banks are arrested for defying martial law by staging a sitdown strike which paralyzed bank operations.

Defiance of government austerity moves is spreading. Two bomb explosions are reported.

July 13—Officials of the University of the Republic accuse the police of firing on students in clashes over rigid security measures imposed last month by President Jorge Pacheco Areco.

July 17—A 24-hour general strike begins in protest over a Government wage freeze imposed on private industry.

VATICAN, THE

July 29—A papal encyclical (an “authentic” but not an infallible pronouncement) is officially presented in which Pope Paul VI rules out the use of artificial methods of birth control.

July 30—A statement by 87 Roman Catholic theologians says that the encyclical opposing birth control, issued by Pope Paul VI, is not binding on Catholic families.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (NORTH)

(See *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

July 4—President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky make a joint public appearance in support of a recently formed national unity alliance, the Peoples Alliance for Social Revolution. The new organization represents a merger of the pro-Thieu Liberal Democratic Force and the pro-Ky National Salvation Front with farm and labor groups.

July 14—*Nhan Dan* (North Vietnamese Communist party newspaper) derides the trial in Saigon of leaders of the Alliance of Nationalist, Democratic and Peace Forces; 10 Alliance officials have been condemned to death in absentia. The Saigon government considers the Alliance pro-Communist.

July 23—It is announced that Truong Dinh Dzu, a peace candidate in last year's presidential election, has been charged with “actions harmful to the anti-Communist spirit of the people and the army.” Dzu has advocated the establishment of a coalition government as a step toward peace.

July 26—Truong Dinh Dzu is sentenced to 5 years at hard labor after a 3-hour military trial.

YUGOSLAVIA

(See also *Intl, Czech Crisis*)

July 18—The Communist party, in a declaration announced by *Tanyug* (Yugoslav press agency), declares its support for the Czechoslovak government and democratization efforts of Alexander Dubcek, Czechoslovak party chief.

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